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ABSTRACT 
MARKET POWER AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
by 
Gabriel Courey 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018 
Under the Supervision of John S. Heywood 
 The first chapter of this dissertation is composed of three related notes on spatial price 
discrimination under convex production costs. First, I consider upstream monopoly when two 
firms downstream have convex production costs. I find that the reduction in social welfare 
associated with the location distortions from upstream monopoly remain but are reduced under 
convex costs. This first section has been published (Courey, 2016). Second, I consider sequential 
location choice by two firms with convex costs (without a upstream monopoly). I find that when 
the slope of the marginal cost curve is steep enough, sequential choice can yield locations with 
greater social welfare than simultaneous choice. Third, I consider both upstream monopoly and 
sequential location choice together. I find that under constant marginal production costs and 
upstream monopoly, sequential and simultaneous choice yield identical locations. Yet this is not 
true with convex costs. The leader always locates closer to the center of the market than under 
simultaneous choice leaving less market for the follower. Regardless of increasing or constant 
marginal costs, social welfare is less than without upstream monopoly or sequential choice.  
 The second chapter estimates gender and racial wage differential in nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals. Past studies have found that economy-wide gender and racial wage differentials 
 ii
are smaller in the nonprofit sector than in the for-profit sector. I show that the massive US 
hospital industry exhibits a different pattern. Gender and racial differentials in nonprofit hospitals 
are larger than in the for-profit hospitals. These findings are robust to various model 
specifications, appear throughout the earnings distribution and in most sub-samples. I argue this 
may reflect weakened monitoring in nonprofit hospitals and contrast this with the traditional 
theory that nonprofits must emphasize wage equality to motivate their workers. 
 The third chapter considers for the first time the endogenous choice of nonprofit status by 
firms in a Cournot duopoly. When firms value profit and consumer surplus (as in the corporate 
social responsibility literature) outputs can be strategic compliments. Thus, a firm adopting 
nonprofit status increases output to meet the zero profit constraint and is rewarded by a further 
increase in output by its unconstrained for-profit rival. This can result in an endogenous mixed 
market despite identical objective functions of the two firms and so provides an explanation for 
the routine presence of such markets. The government's optimal choice of nonprofit tax-
exemption can generate a socially superior endogenous mixed market.  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1 Spatial Price Discrimination and Convex Production Costs: Three
Related Notes
1.1 Introduction
In Hurter and Lederer’s (1985) canonical model of spatial price discrimination, locations are first-best. Given
inelastic demand, their locations yield social eﬃciency. Thus subsequent additions to the model which alter
location choice necessarily reduce welfare. Gupta, Katz and Pal (1994) show that when firms purchase inputs
from an upstream monopoly, downstream firms will move away from the transport cost minimizing locations
in order to force an upstream monopoly to lower its price. Gupta (1992) shows that when firms locate
sequentially (instead of simultaneously as in Hurter and Lederer) the first-mover locates closer to the center
of the market causing a reduction in social welfare. Critically, throughout these papers, marginal production
costs are assumed to be constant.
In this paper, I adopt a model of spatial price discrimination where firms have convex production costs
(increasing marginal cost). With convex costs locations are not first-best even without upstream monopoly
or sequential location choice (Gupta, 1994). When delivered marginal cost generates the final price, firms
have a strong incentive to give away marginal customers. Doing so reduces their own delivered marginal
cost while increasing that of their rival. The consequence is a larger profit margin on each infra-marginal
customer. Thus, the equilibrium with convex costs has the two firms sharing the market but each has moved
ineﬃciently toward the edge of the market. Therefore, modifications to the model such as an upstream
monopoly or sequential location choice will alter locations but do not necessarily reduce social welfare.
This essay consists of three sections that are each “note” length presentations. First, I consider upstream
monopoly when two firms downstream have convex production costs. I find that the reduction in social
welfare associated with the location distortions from upstream monopoly remain but are reduced under
convex costs. This first section has been published (Courey, forthcoming). Second, I consider sequential
location choice by two firms with convex costs (without a upstream monopoly). I find that when the slope of
the marginal cost curve is steep enough, sequential choice can yield locations with greater social welfare than
simultaneous choice. Third, I consider both upstream monopoly and sequential location choice together. I
find that under constant marginal production costs and upstream monopoly, sequential and simultaneous
choice yield identical locations. Yet this is not true with convex costs. The leader always locates closer to
the center of the market than under simultaneous choice leaving less market for the follower. Regardless of
increasing or constant marginal costs, social welfare is less than without upstream monopoly or sequential
choice.
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This paper enriches the expansive literature on location choice under spatial price discrimination. Spatial
price discrimination is both common (Greenhut, 1981) and socially beneficial. Given the choice of pricing
policy, firms will usually choose to use said spatially discriminatory pricing (Thisse and Vives, 1988). The
equilibrium locations under such pricing strategy are Pareto superior to the well-known Hotelling (1929) and
d’Aspermont et. al (1979) pricing systems (Hurter and Lederer, 1985).
Though inspired by the choice of physical location, spatial models also can be used to describe other
types of choices. For example, product variety (e.g. sweetness of cereal) can be thought of as a line segment.
Diﬀerent firms locate by choosing which variety they will produce. Thus the characteristics of these spatial
models have been applied more generally than to only the physical locations of firms.
1.2 Upstream Monopoly
For two decades it has been recognized that under spatial price discrimination one of the costs of upstream
monopoly has been distortion in downstream location. Gupta, Katz and Pal (1994) show that downstream
firms will move away from the transport cost minimizing locations in order to force an upstream monopoly
to lower its price. Specifically, downstream firms locate asymmetrically, crowding one side of a linear market
to increase the transport cost to reach distant customers and so forcing the monopolist’s input price down.
While this has been confirmed for linear production costs downstream, the case of convex production costs
has not been examined and brings unique aspects worthy of examination.
More recently, Beladi, Chakrabarti and Marjit (2008, 2010) confirm location distortions from upstream
monopoly. Their model assumes constant marginal cost and, ad-hoc, that each firm sells to a predetermined
fraction of the consumers, regardless of location. I build oﬀ the more traditional case, as in Gupta, Katz
and Pal (1994).
Convex costs under spatial price discrimination has also long been known to generate ineﬃcient locations
even without upstream monopoly (Gupta, 1994). When delivered marginal cost generates the final price,
firms have a strong incentive to give away marginal customers. Doing so reduces their own delivered marginal
cost while increasing that of their rival. The consequence is a larger profit margin on each infra-marginal
customer. Thus, the equilibrium with convex costs has the two firms sharing the market but each has moved
ineﬃciently toward the edge of the market. Thus, it is interesting whether the distortion caused by an
upstream monopoly reinforces or mitigates that caused by cost convexity.
In this paper, I adopt the duopoly-downstream case of Gupta et al. (1994) and consider the cost of
upstream monopoly with convex costs downstream. Unique to this model, the cost of the upstream monopoly
potentially includes both distortions in transport and production cost. Despite this, upstream monopoly
2
hurts welfare less than when downstream production costs are linear.
1.2.1 Model and solution
Consumers are distributed uniformly on the unit line, each with perfectly inelastic demand and reservation
price r.1 Identical goods are provided by two downstream firms who purchase their input from an upstream
monopolist who, in turn, sets the input price. Downstream firms are subject to transport cost equal to the
distance from the firm to the customer.2 Downstream firms have convex production costs, or increasing
marginal cost; specifically, C(qi) = P ⇤uqi + 12kq
2
i .
Timing is organized in 4 stages. In stage 1 it is determined whether it is both downstream firms or just
one downstream firm that will be critical in determining the upstream price. In stage 2, the downstream
firms choose their locations on the unit interval. In stage 3, the upstream firm sets the price of the input.
In stage 4, the downstream firms set the price schedule of the final good, consumers purchase the good, and
profits are calculated. The timing of stages 2 through 4 follows Gupta et al. (1994). They suggest this is
a sensible order since location is typically a long run choice and price is typically a short run choice. The
inclusion of stage 1 is necessary for determining which firm benefits from asymmetric payoﬀs (as in Gupta
et al., 1994). The game is solved with backward induction.
Payoﬀs are as follows: The upstream firm earns profit equal to the price of the input times the number
of customers served. The downstream firms’ profit are total revenue minus transport cost, production cost,
and total cost of inputs.
In stage 4, consumers purchase from the downstream firm who charges them the lowest price. If two
firms charge the same price, the consumer buys from the firm with the lower delivered marginal cost. This is
commonly justified by the fact that the firm with the lower delivered marginal cost can lower price slightly
below that of the other firm and take the sale.
No downstream firm charges a price higher than the reservation price, r, since no consumer would buy.
Neither firm sets price below their own delivered marginal cost. Thus, the firm with the lower delivered
marginal cost wins the sale by pricing no higher than their rivals delivered marginal cost. Figure 1 illustrates
the price schedule by a darkened line: both firms charge either the reservation price or the delivered marginal
cost of their rival, whichever is lower.
[Figure 1 about here. Title: "Marginal costs, market division, prices and locations"]
1While inelastic demand is a critical assumption, Hamilton, Thisse and Weskamp (1989) have examined cases of downward
sloping demand at each location.
2Transport cost is normalized to one.
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This leads to the profit equations for downstream firms:
⇡1 =
aˆ
0
rdx+
x⇤ˆ
a
[P ⇤u + k(1  x⇤) + (L2   x)] dx
 
L1ˆ
0
(L1   x)dx 
x⇤ˆ
L1
(x  L1)dx  1
2
k(x⇤)2   P ⇤ux⇤ (1)
⇡2 =
bˆ
x⇤
[P ⇤u + k(x
⇤) + (x  L1)] dx+
1ˆ
b
rdx 
L2ˆ
x⇤
(L2   x)dx
 
1ˆ
L2
(x  L2)dx  1
2
k(1  x⇤)2   P ⇤u (1  x⇤) (2)
where a = L2   (r   k(1  x⇤)  P ⇤u ) and b = L1 + (r   kx⇤   P ⇤u ) are shown in Figure 1, and
x⇤ =
k + L2 + L1
2k + 2
(3)
is the market division.3
In stage 3, the upstream firm sets the price of the input, P ⇤u , to maximize its own profit. Crucially, the
input price can be set so high that the downstream firms cannot aﬀord to serve the most distant customer(s).
Whether upstream profit is maximized when all the market is served or when some customers are not served
depends on the reservation price, r. If r is low enough, then the upstream firm could do better by increasing
the input price even if it means losing some customers. However, if r is big enough, upstream profit is
maximized when all customers are served.
Following Gupta, et al. (1994) I focus on the case where r is suﬃciently high so that all customers are
served. Specifically, when r   r⇤ = k2+6k+42k+2 , P ⇤u is such that all consumers are served.
Under this assumption, the upstream firm sets the highest price such that the entire market is served. This
requires the input price to be set such that the price charged to a “critical” customer equals the reservation
price. In Figure 1, the critical customer, marked by a dot, is located at 1, and firm 2 is the critical firm. The
firm which sells to the critical customer in equilibrium is labeled the “critical” firm. The distance between
3Setting delivered marginal cost of both firms equal, kx⇤ + x⇤  L1 = k(1  x⇤) +L2   x⇤, and rearranging yields the result
in (3).
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the critical firm and the critical customer is the furthest distance between any customer and firm.
P ⇤u = r  max {L1 + kx⇤, L2   x⇤ + k(1  x⇤), 1  L2 + k(1  x⇤)} (4)
It is possible to have one, two or three critical customers and one or two critical firms. With constant
marginal costs in duopoly, only one firm is critical (see Gupta, et al., 1994). I confirm that with increasing
marginal costs in duopoly, only one firm is critical. First, no more than one firm is critical in equilibrium.4
Second, given that only one firm is critical, neither firm can increase its profit by deviating so as to change
the critical firm or customer.5 This process closely follows Gupta et al. (1994) and the demonstration is
available upon request.
Whether a firm is critical is left to be decided in stage 1. I investigate the subgame in which firm 2 is
critical, as shown in Figure 1. The input price from (4) is now
P ⇤u = r   [1  L2 + k(1  x⇤)] (5)
Since the market is a unit line, P ⇤u is also the profit of the upstream monopolist.
In stage 2, the downstream firms locate to maximize their own profit given P ⇤u and the delivered price
schedule. Taking the first derivative of (1) and (2) with respect to L1 and L2 yields the first-order conditions
which can be rearranged to reveal best response functions. Solving the system of best response functions
yields unique locations that exist for all k. The objective functions satisfy the necessary second-order condi-
tions.6 The Nash equilibrium in downstream locations is
L⇤1 =
4k2 + 9k + 2
32k2 + 48k + 12
, L⇤2 =
20k2 + 27k + 6
32k2 + 48k + 12
(6)
Table 1 shows equilibrium locations from (6) at selected values of k. These are a generalization of Gupta
et al. (1994) and return their result when k = 0. Within the subgame with firm 2 critical, this location
equilibrium is unique.
4There are four potential cases in which both firms are critical: (a) one critical customer is located at the center of the
market, (b) two critical customers, each at one edge of the market, (c) two critical customers, one at an edge and one at the
market division, and (d) three critical customers, two at the edges and one at the market division. In each of these cases, at
least one firm can improve its profit by deviating. This demonstration is available upon request.
5Within the case when firm 2 is the critical firm, there are six possible deviations in location. If firm 1 deviates left or firm
2 deviates left while remaining to the right of firm 1, the critical firm and customer do not change. Firm 2 clearly will not
locate to the left of firm 1. If either firm deviates far enough right, the critical firm and/or critical customer could change.
By comparing the firms’ highest profits from any of these deviations to their original locations reveals no firm can increase its
profit by deviating so as to change the critical firm or critical customer.
6These conditions are @
2⇡1
@L21
=  (8k
2+15k+6)
4k2+8k+4
< 0; @
2⇡2
@L22
=  (24k
2+31k+10)
4k2+8k+4
< 0. Together with the demonstrations that no
more than one firm is critical and, given that only one firm is critical, no firm will deviate so as to change the critical firm or
customer, these imply that the locations in (5) are a Nash equilibrium.
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[ Table 1 about here ]
Combining (6) with (1), (2), (3) and (5), yields profits and market division. These results are unique
conditional on firm 2 being critical.
⇡⇤1 =
128k5 + 528k4 + 784k3 + 493k2 + 132k + 12
1024k4 + 3072k3 + 3072k2 + 1152k + 144
(7)
⇡⇤2 =
128k5 + 528k4 + 800k3 + 549k2 + 172k + 20
1024k4 + 3072k3 + 3072k2 + 1152k + 144
(8)
P ⇤u = r  
16k3   40k2   29k   6
32k2 + 48k + 12
(9)
x⇤ =
4k2 + 5k + 1
8k2 + 12k + 3
(10)
Proposition 1 summarizes the eﬀect of convex costs on location, market division and profits.
Proposition 1: As k increases
(a) The non-critical firm locates closer to the center until k = 0.2242, and then locates closer to
the edge of the market; and, the critical firm always locates closer to the edge.
(b) ⇡⇤1 and ⇡⇤2 increase
(c) P ⇤u decreases
(d) x⇤ approaches 12
Proof: Consider the subgame when firm 2 is critical. For (a) - (c), diﬀerentiate equations (6)
- (9). For (d), take the limit of (10) as k goes to infinite. The results are identical in the
subgame with firm 1 critical.
In stage 1, it is determined whether one of the two firms is critical. The outcome could be determined by
the firms’ technology, size, other “objective” characteristics, or by sheer luck. Conditional on stage 1, the
subgame Nash equilibrium locations, prices and payoﬀs are unique.7
Before analyzing the cost of upstream monopoly, I derive the costs of serving the market in the equilibrium
with convex costs. Unique to this model, there are two types of costs: transport and production cost.
Transport (TC) and production cost (PC) are
7In a subgame with firm 1 critical, unique equilibrium locations exist that are symmetric to those in equation (6) and Table
1. In this case, for example, if k = 0.1, then (L⇤1, L⇤2) = (0.480, 0.828).
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TC =
L1ˆ
0
(L1   x)dx+
x⇤ˆ
L1
(x  L1)dx+
L2ˆ
x⇤
(x  L2)dx+
1ˆ
L2
(L2   x)dx (11)
PC = k(x⇤)2 + k(1  x⇤)2 (12)
The costs in equilibrium come from combining (6) with (11) and (12), yielding
TC⇤ =
80k4 + 224k3 + 229k2 + 90k + 12
512k4 + 1536k3 + 1536k2 + 576k + 72
(13)
PC⇤ =
32k5 + 96k4 + 98k3 + 38k2 + 5k
128k4 + 384k3 + 384k2 + 144k + 18
(14)
Total social cost is the sum of transport and production cost, SC⇤ = TC⇤ + PC⇤, so in equilibrium
SC⇤ =
128k5 + 464k4 + 616k3 + 381k2 + 110k + 12
512k4 + 1536k3 + 1536k2 + 576k + 72
(15)
Proposition 2 summarizes the eﬀect of convex costs on transport, production, and total social cost.
Proposition 2: As k increases
(a) TC⇤ decreases until k = 1.3902, and then increases. TC⇤ is largest when k = 0
(b) PC⇤ increases
(c) SC⇤ increases
Proof: Diﬀerentiate equations (13) - (16).
The location equilibrium in (6) can be compared with the equilibrium locations without upstream monopoly.
Without the upstream monopoly, downstream firms choose the locations derived by Gupta (1994): LG1 =
k+2
8k+8 and L
G
2 =
7k+6
8k+8 . These locations collapse to first best with firms at the first and third quartiles when
k = 0. As the marginal cost curve becomes steeper the firms move away from their eﬃcient quartiles toward
the edge of the market: LG1 decreases and LG2 increases.
The location distortion caused by upstream monopoly as opposed to perfect competition is summarized
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: With convex costs, upstream monopoly causes both firms to crowd one edge of
the market.
Proof: Consider the subgame when firm 2 is critical. Compare (6) with the Gupta (1994)
locations. For all values of k > 0, L⇤1 < LG1 and L⇤2 < LG2 . The result holds in the subgame
with firm 1 critical.
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Since the size of the market is fixed, the cost of upstream monopoly can be measured by comparing total
social cost with an without upstream monopoly.
Total transport and production cost without upstream monopoly, TCG and PCG, come from plugging
LG1 and LG2 into (11) and (12). Transport and production cost added by upstream monopoly are
TC⇤   TCG = 64k
5 + 276k4 + 424k3 + 295k2 + 96k + 12
2048k6 + 10240k5 + 20480k4 + 20736k3 + 11040k2 + 2880k + 288
(16)
PC⇤   PCG = 4k
3 + 4k2 + k
256k4 + 768k3 + 768k2 + 288k + 36
(17)
Social cost without upstream monopoly is SCG = TCG + PCG. Social cost of upstream monopoly is
SC⇤   SCG = 96k
5 + 372k4 + 528k3 + 343k2 + 104k + 12
2048k6 + 10240k5 + 20480k4 + 20736k3 + 11040k2 + 2880k + 288
(18)
Transport and production cost added by upstream monopoly and the total social cost of upstream monopoly
are summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: As k increases
(a) TC⇤   TCG, decreases and remains positive.
(b) PC⇤   PCG increases until k = 0.8117, and then decreases, and remains positive.
(c) SC⇤   SCG decreases and remains positive.
Proof: Diﬀerentiate equations (16) - (18).
Proposition 4.(a) and 4.(b) are illustrated in Table 1 where transport and production cost from upstream
monopoly are shown for various values of k. The increase in social cost associated with this model is the
sum of these two costs. For larger k, this increase is smaller.
1.2.2 Summary
In a spatial price discrimination model, an upstream monopoly imposes a cost to society. I evaluate this cost
when there are convex production costs downstream. For the first time, upstream monopoly distorts both
transport and production costs. However, as the marginal cost curve becomes steeper, added transport cost
decreases, added production cost increases initially and then decreases, and total social cost associated with
upstream monopoly decreases.
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1.3 Sequential Location
This paper uniquely demonstrates that with convex production costs the influence of location timing on social
welfare diﬀers from that anticipated with constant marginal production costs. With constant marginal costs
sequential location always increases transport costs and lowers social welfare relative to simultaneous location
(Gupta 1992; Hurter and Lederer, 1985). I demonstrate for the first time that with convex production costs
sequential location frequently yields welfare superior locations. Thus, the prevailing notion that first mover
advantages hurt welfare under spatial price discrimination does not apply with convex productions.
This diﬀerence emerges, in part, because of the distortion from first best generated by convex costs.
Gupta (1994) shows that two firms locating simultaneously with convex costs locate ineﬃciency far apart.
She demonstrates that when delivered marginal costs set the final price, firms have a strong incentive to
give away marginal customers in order to retain larger profit on the infra-marginal customers. They retain
symmetric locations but move outside the eﬃcient quartiles. This gives rise to the possibility that sequential
location can improve welfare.
I derive for the first time a sequential location equilibrium and compare it with Gupta’s (1994) well known
simultaneous location equilibrium. While sequential location results in asymmetric locations, I demonstrate
that this asymmetry fades as costs become more convex (the marginal cost curve slope increases). This
fading asymmetry reduces the production cost disadvantage of sequential location. Moreover, the two firms
locate strictly closer to each other than with simultaneous location lowering transport cost. Thus, with
suﬃcient cost convexity the ineﬃciency associated with asymmetry is outweighed by the eﬃciency of being
closer together.
Delivered pricing is both commonly modeled and frequently observed. Such spatial models have proven
especially useful in capturing aspects of competition in horizontally diﬀerentiated markets (Tirole 1988).
They provide a general method for examining markets in which either actual location or an ordered product
characteristic (for example, sweetness of cereal or time of service) diﬀerentiates output. As the price includes
delivery, the price a firm is able to charge depends upon how “close” it is to its rivals. Such models diﬀer
from freight-on-board models in which delivery is not part of the final price (Hotelling 1929 and d’Aspermont
et al. 1979). Thisse and Vives (1988) show that spatial price discrimination and the associated delivered
pricing is the preferred alternative whenever firms are able to adopt it and Greenhut (1981) identifies it as
“nearly ubiquitous” among products with substantial freight costs.
Since Gupta (1994), the assumption of convex costs has been a recurring aspect of regional science
research. In the short run, convex costs fits the basic intuition of diminishing marginal productivity. In the
long run, this cost assumption implies firm level diseconomies of scale. Indeed, studies of manufacturing,
9
pharmaceuticals and banking confirm such diseconomies (Hsieh 1995, Huang and Wang 2001, Assaf 2010,
Ramcharran 2011 and Nubuyuki 2004). For example, Hsieh (1995) estimates industry-wide cost functions
and finds decreasing returns in the US tobacco, apparel and petroleum industries. Thus, at minimum, cost
convexity stands as a realistic alternative to constant costs and its implications deserve further study.
Models using convex costs in spatial price discrimination include Heywood and Wang (2014, 2016) who
examine mergers and consistent location conjectures, Courey (2016) who examines vertical relations between
an upstream monopoly and downstream competition, and Heywood et al. (forthcoming) who examine the
diﬀerence that convex costs make for collusion among spatial rivals (Gupta and Venkatu 2002). These models
all imagine two rivals with simultaneous location. Thus, my comparison between location timings represents
important value-added.
Considering sequential location in location models goes back at least 40 years (Hay 1976) and continues
to attract attention (Götz 2005). This attention reflects the reality that locating plants takes time and
rarely happens simultaneously. Sequential entry examinations within spatial price discrimination focus on
zoning (Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Iziga 2014), mixed oligopoly (Heywood and Ye 2009), mergers (Rothschild,
Heywood and Monaco 2007; Heywood and Ye 2013), and R&D (Heywood and Wang 2017). I contribute by
uniquely introducing the realism of convex costs for sequentially locating firms.
In what follows, the next section compares the simultaneously and sequential location equilibria. The
critical point of comparison is the welfare which with the assumption of inelastic demand is willingness to
pay minus the sum of production and transport costs.
1.3.1 Model and solution
In this section, I first derive the sequential location equilibrium and second, compare it with Gupta’s (1994)
simultaneous location equilibrium. The model is the same as that in the first note with respect to consumers
and transport cost. The diﬀerence is that the input price is not set by an upstream monopoly so production
cost is C(qi) = 12kq
2
i . Timing is organized in 3 stages. In stages 1 and 2 the leader and follower choose their
locations on the unit interval.8 In stage 3, the firms set the price schedule of the final good and consumers
purchase the good. This timing follows Gupta (1992). The game is solved by backward induction.
Payoﬀs (profits) for the firm’s are total revenue minus the sum of transport and production cost. In each
stage, firms act so as to maximize their own profit, given the action or expected response of their rival.
In stage 3, consumers purchase from the firm charging the lowest price. If two firms charge the same
price, the consumer buys from the firm with lower delivered marginal cost. This is commonly justified by
8I assume that firm 1, the firm on the left side of the market, is the leader. Of course, a symmetric case exists where firm 1
is the follower.
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the fact that the firm with the lower delivered marginal cost can lower price just below that of the rival and
take the sale. Neither firm sets price below their own delivered marginal cost. Thus, the firm with the lower
delivered marginal cost wins the sale by pricing no higher than their rivals delivered marginal cost (Gupta,
1994). Figure 2 illustrates the resulting price schedule by a darkened line.
[ Figure 2 about here ]
This leads to the profit equations for firms 1 and 2, respectively:
⇡1 =
x⇤ˆ
0
[k(1  x⇤) + (L2   x)] dx 
L1ˆ
0
(L1   x)dx 
x⇤ˆ
L1
(x  L1)dx  1
2
k(x⇤)2 (19)
⇡2 =
1ˆ
x⇤
[k(x⇤) + (x  L1)] dx 
L2ˆ
x⇤
(L2   x)dx 
1ˆ
LF
(x  L2)dx  1
2
k(1  x⇤)2 (20)
where Li 2 (0, 1) is firm i’s location and
x⇤(L1, L2) =
k + L1 + L2
2k + 2
(21)
divides the market and identifies the indiﬀerent consumer.
In stage 2, the follower chooses the location that maximizes profit, given the leader’s location. Taking
the first derivative of ⇡2 with respect to L2 and rearranging to solve for L2 yields the best-response function
for the follower,
LBR2 =
(k + 2)L1 + 7k2 + 12k + 4
8k2 + 15k + 6
. (22)
In stage 1, the leader knows the follower’s best response function. Plugging (22) into (19), and diﬀeren-
tiating (19) with respect to L1 yields the subgame perfect Nash location for the leader,
L⇤1 =
8k4 + 38k3 + 62k2 + 40k + 8
64k4 + 232k3 + 289k2 + 140k + 20
. (23)
Plugging (23) into (22) yields the subgame perfect Nash location of the follower,9
L⇤2 =
56k4 + 195k3 + 232k2 + 108k + 16
64k4 + 232k3 + 289k2 + 140k + 20
. (24)
9Second-order conditions for profit-maximization are met for these locations.
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These generalize Gupta (1992) and collapse to her result of L1 = 0.4 and L2 = 0.8 when k = 0. Combining
(23) and (24) with (19), (20), and (21) yield equilibrium profits, which are available from the author, and
market division
x⇤(L⇤1, L
⇤
2) =
32k4 + 116k3 + 145k2 + 72k + 12
64k4 + 232k3 + 289k2 + 140k + 20
. (25)
The sequential choice location equilibrium in (23) and (24) can be contrasted with an equilibrium where
firms choose locations simultaneously (Gupta, 1994):
L⇤⇤1 =
k+2
8k+8 (26)
L⇤⇤2 =
7k+6
8k+8 . (27)
These locations collapse to first best with firms at the first and third quartiles when k = 0. As the marginal
cost curve becomes steeper the firms move away from their eﬃcient quartiles toward the edge of the market:
L⇤⇤1 decreases and L⇤⇤2 increases.10 These ineﬃcient locations caused by convex costs means social welfare can
possibly be improved by sequential location. This improvement is possible because the sequential locations
are closer than simultaneous locations (see Figure 3). The distance between simultaneous locations is D⇤⇤ ⌘
L⇤⇤2   L⇤⇤1 = 3k+24k+4 . The distance between sequential locations is D⇤ ⌘ L⇤2   L⇤1 = 48k
4+157k3+170k2+68k+8
64k4+232k3+289k2+140k+20 .
Subtracting these yields D⇤⇤   D⇤ = 4k4+23k3+46k2+36k+8256k5+1184k4+2084k3+1716k2+640k+80 . This is positive for all k   0,
confirming that the sequential locations are closer.
[ Figure 2 about here ]
Figure 3 compares equilibrium locations for various values of k. With sequential location, the leader
always locates closer to the center, while the follower locates closer to the edge. As the slope of the marginal
cost curve, k, increases, firms locate further apart. Sequential locations become more symmetric and the
market shares become more equal. Indeed, L⇤1 approaches 18 and L
⇤
2 approaches 78 as k goes to infinity.
Since the firms always locate closer to one another with sequential location, the ineﬃciency caused by
convex costs, locating too far apart, can be mitigated. Proposition 5 compares social welfare under sequential
location, SW ⇤, and under simultaneous location, SW ⇤⇤, where 4SW = SW ⇤   SW ⇤⇤.
Proposition 5: 4SW > 0 if k > 0.300 and 4SW  0 otherwise.
10Equilibrium profits are available from the author.
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Proof: Since the size of the market is fixed, SW = r   SC, where SC is the sum of production
and transport cost,
SC =
L1ˆ
0
(L1   x)dx+
x⇤ˆ
L1
(x L1)dx+
L2ˆ
x⇤
(x L2)dx+
1ˆ
L2
(L2   x)dx+ k(x⇤)2 + k(1  x⇤)2. (28)
Social cost with sequential location comes from combining (23) and (24) with (28) yielding
SC⇤ =
⇥
2048k9 + 16128k8 + 54144k7 + 101210k6 + 115561k5 + 83319k4 + 37936k3 + 10568k2 + 1648k + 112
⇤
/⌦
(29)
where ⌦ = 8192k8+59392k7+181632k6+304032k5+302082k4+180400k3+62320k2+11200k+800.
Similarly using (26) and (27) from simultaneous location yields
SC⇤⇤ =
8k3 + 21k2 + 16k + 4
32k2 + 64k + 32
.
Thus,
 SW = (r   SC⇤)  (r   SC⇤⇤) = SC⇤⇤   SC⇤
=
⇥
512k9 + 4768k8 + 18504k7 + 38565k6 + 46040k5 + 30380k4 + 8640k3   976k2   1152k   192⇤ / .(30)
where   = 131072k10 + 1212416k9 + 4937728k8 + 11627008k7 + 17468448k6 + 17417536k5 +
11603232k4 + 5059840k3 + 1368320 ⇤ k + 204800k + 12800.
Equation (30) has one root of k = 0.300 when k   0. Values to the left of the root are negative
and values to the right of the root are positive.11
Sequential location has greater social welfare than simultaneous location with suﬃciently convex costs.12
Note that the parameter k serves two roles. It determines both the level of production cost and the slope
of the marginal cost curve. The first eﬀect (the production cost level) becomes irrelevant assuming the
reservation price r is high enough. Thus the second eﬀect (the marginal cost curve slope) drives the main
results.
Timing aﬀects social welfare both through transport and production costs. Denote TC⇤and PC⇤ as
11Plotting values for very large k suggests that (30) stays positive but converges to zero.
12One could imagine a pre-game delay that allows firms to choose their location stage (Hamilton and Slutsky 1990). Given
such a delay the subgame perfect equilibrium would have both firms locating in the first stage. Thus the socially superior
sequential timing in Proposition 1 requires exogenous sequential location. The proposition makes clear that a welfare maximizing
government has an incentive to establish such sequential location. Furthermore, experimental research on the pre-game delay
demonstrates that subjects often fail to act simultaneously even if doing so is superior (Fonseca, Muller and Normann 2006).
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transport and production cost, respectively, with sequential location; while TC⇤⇤ and PC⇤⇤ are the costs
with simultaneous location. Let4TC = TC⇤ TC⇤⇤ and4PC = PC⇤ PC⇤⇤ be the diﬀerence in transport
and production costs between sequential location and simultaneous location. The greater social welfare from
sequential location is the smaller sum of additional transport and production costs,4SW =  (4TC+4PC).
The eﬀect of timing on transport and production costs is summarized in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6: When k > 0.300, and social welfare is improved by sequential location, the larger
production cost, 4PC > 0, is outweighed by the smaller transport cost, 4TC < 0.
Proof: Social cost has two elements: transport (TC) and production cost (PC) where
TC =
L1ˆ
0
(L1   x)dx+
x⇤ˆ
L1
(x  L1)dx+
L2ˆ
x⇤
(x  L2)dx+
1ˆ
L2
(L2   x)dx (31)
PC = k(x⇤)2 + k(1  x⇤)2. (32)
These costs with sequential location come from inserting (23) and (24) into (31) and (32) yielding
TC⇤ =
⇥
1280k8 + 8736k7 + 25202k6 + 40040k5 + 38215k4 + 22344k3 + 7752k2 + 1440k + 112
⇤
/⌦
(33)
PC⇤ =
⇥
2048k9 + 14848k8 + 45408k7 + 76008k6 + 75521k5 + 45104k4 + 15592k3 + 2816k2 + 208k
⇤
/⌦.
(34)
Similarly, using (26) and (27) yields costs with simultaneous location:
TC⇤⇤ =
5k2 + 8k + 4
32k2 + 64k + 32
(35)
PC⇤⇤ =
k
4
. (36)
Thus,
4TC =TC⇤   TC⇤⇤
=
⇥
512k9 + 4768k8 + 18512k7 + 38645k6 + 46368k5 + 31084k4 + 9472k3   464k2   1024k   192⇤ / 
(37)
14
4PC =PC⇤   PC⇤⇤
=
k5 + 8k4 + 24k3 + 32k2 + 16k
16384k8 + 118784k7 + 363264k6 + 608064k5 + 604164k4 + 360800k3 + 124640k2 + 22400k + 1600)
.
(38)
Equations (37) and (38) each have one root, and each root is less than k = 0.300. To the right
of their respective roots, in particular at k = 0.300, (37) is negative and (38) is positive.13
Sequential location improves social welfare because it yields lower transport cost than simultaneous loca-
tion. The eﬃciency is gained from locating closer together, despite the ineﬃcient asymmetry. Meanwhile,
production costs are always higher with sequential location since the symmetry under simultaneous location
minimizes production cost. The additional production cost under sequential location is outweighed by the
reduction in transport cost. The result is that social welfare is improved with sequential location.
1.3.2 Summary
It has been understood that sequential location hurts social welfare by generating asymmetry and increasing
transport cost. The leader uses its timing advantage to take more market share and the firms end up
ineﬃciently close to one another. However, this assumes constant marginal production costs. I find that
with convex production costs locating closer together can improve social eﬃciency. I derive for the first time
the sequential location equilibrium under convex costs, and compare it with Gupta’s (1994) simultaneous
locations. The social costs of the asymmetry associated with sequential locations are smaller than those
associated with the too distant simultaneous locations.
A possible extension to this analysis would consider more than two firms. Three firms with constant
marginal cost that enter sequentially locate symmetrically but ineﬃciently close (Gupta, 1992). However,
models of spatial price discrimination have yet to consider more than two firms with convex costs. Thus,
with convex costs, it is not obvious how timing aﬀects social welfare if three or more firms enter the market.
1.4 Upstream Monopoly and Sequential Location Downstream
I derive the Stackelberg equilibrium location choices when firms with convex costs buy a input from an
upstream monopoly. Since an upstream monopoly requires one of the firms to be specified as the “critical”
firm, it must be determined whether the critical firm moves first or second. I consider both cases separately
and discuss their results. I contrast sequential moves to simultaneous moves, focusing on the relationship of
convex costs to locations, profits, and social costs.
13Plotting for very large k suggests that (37) and (38) remain positive and negative, respectively, until they converge to zero.
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1.4.1 Model and solution
Reintroducing an upstream monopoly who sets the input price means cost functions return to C(qi) =
P ⇤uqi +
1
2kq
2
i . Since there is an upstream monopoly one of the two firms will be critical. While under
simultaneous location choice the critical firm was determined in a first stage, the sequential choice set up
allows the leader to choose whether she is critical or not (implicitly by her location choice). Thus, timing
is organized in 4 stages. In stage 1, the leader firm chooses its location on the unit interval. In stage 2,
the follower chooses its location. In stage 3, the upstream firm sets the price of the input. In stage 4, the
downstream firms set the price schedule of the final good, consumers purchase the good, and profits are
calculated. The game is solved with backward induction. Payoﬀs are calculated in the same way as under
simultaneous choice.
In stage 4, prices and consumption decisions are identical to the simultaneous choice model, and so profit
functions and market division are (1), (2) and (3).
In stage 3, the upstream price is set in the same way as in the simultaneous choice model, and so input
price is (4). Recall that the upstream firm sets the highest price such that the entire market is served. This
requires the input price to be set such that the price charged to a “critical” customer equals the reservation
price. The firm which sells to the critical customer in equilibrium is labeled the “critical” firm. The distance
between the critical firm and the critical customer is the furthest distance between any customer and firm.
It is possible that the leader chooses (implicitly by her location) to be critical or non-critical. In fact,
the leader will always choose to be critical. Doing so always yields more market share and profit. Following
a process similar to that under simultaneous choice, there is always one critical firm, who is the leader.
Thus, this model does not require a first stage to predetermine which firm is critical. To provide consistency
and allow comparison with the simultaneous choice locations, I derive results for the leading (critical) firm
locating on the right side of the market. A symmetric equilibrium also exists which is identical in terms of
profits and welfare. Thus, from equations (1) and (2), the leader’s profit equation is (2) and the follower’s
profit equation is (1). To avoid confusion I change subscripts to L for leader and F for follower. In this case
the input price (which is also the upstream monopoly’s profit) is again (5).
In stage 2, follower chooses the location that maximizes its profit, taking the leader’s location as given.
Taking the first derivative of (1) with respect to L1 (location of the follower) yields the best-response function
for the follower,
LBRF =
(k + 2)LL + k2 + 2k
8k2 + 15k + 6
. (39)
In stage 1, the first mover has the advantage of knowing the best response function of the follower.
Plugging (38) into (1), and diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to L1 yields the equilibrium location for the
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leader,
L⇤L =
120k4 + 346k3 + 331k2 + 116k + 12
192k4 + 584k3 + 595k2 + 228k + 28
. (40)
Note that when k < 0.19043, L⇤1 < 0.5. This is not possible in equilibrium because firm 2 would always
choose to jump to the right of its rival. In order to ensure firm one does not jump to the right side of the
market, firm 2 cannot locate to the left of 0.5. Thus, in equilibrium
L⇤L =
8>><>>:
0.5 for k  0.19043
120k4+346k3+331k2+116k+12
192k4+584k3+595k2+228k+28 for k >0.19043
(41)
Plugging (40) into (38) yields the equilibrium location of the critical firm,
L⇤F =
8>><>>:
2k2+5k+2
16k2+30k+12 fork  0.19043
24k4+91k3+105k2+40k+4
192k4+584k3+595k2+228k+28 for k >0.19043
(42)
Table 2 shows equilibrium locations at selected values of k. Proposition 7 summarizes the eﬀect of convex
costs on equilibrium sequential locations.
Proposition 7:
(a) When k = 0, sequential choice yields identical locations as simultaneous choice.
(b) @LL@k = 0 if 0 < k < 0.190;
@LL
@k > 0 otherwise.
(c) @LF@k < 0 if 0 < k < 0.190 or k > 0.388;
@LF
@k > 0 otherwise.
Proof: For (a), compare (37) and (38) with locations from Gupta et. al (1994). For (b) and (c),
diﬀerentiate and identify roots for equations (37) - (38).
Profits and market division in equilibrium come from combining (37) and (38) with (1), (2), and (3), respec-
tively, yielding
⇡⇤L =
8>><>>:
32k5+144k4+274k3+257k2+116k+20
256k4+960k3+1284k2+720k+144 fork  0.19043
48k5+200k4+307k3+214k2+68k+8
384k4+1168k3+1190k2+456k+56 for k >0.19043
(43)
⇡⇤F =
8>><>>:
4k3+12k2+9k+2
32k2+60k+24 fork  0.19043
9216k9+66432k8+203248k7+343198k6+349260k5+220117k4+85000k3+19032k2+2144k+80
73728k8+448512k7+1139072k6+1565024k5+1262162k4+608048k3+170608k2+25536⇤k+1568 for k >0.19043
(44)
x⇤ =
8>><>>:
4k2+6k+2
8k2+15k+6 fork  0.19043
96k4+268k3+248k2+84k+8
192k4+584k3+595k2+228k+28 for k >0.19043
(45)
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The costs in equilibrium come from combining (37) and (38) with (11), (12) and (30), yielding
TC⇤seq =
8>><>>:
26k4+86k3+109k2+60k+12
128k4+480k3+642k2+360k+72 fork  0.19043
11520k8+67872k7+169970k6+234264k5+192483k4+95816k3+28200k2+4512k+304
73728k8+448512k7+1139072k6+1565024k5+1262162k4+608048k3+170608k2+25536k+1568 for k >0.19043
(46)
PC⇤seq =
8>><>>:
32k5+120k4+165k3+96k2+20k
128k4+480k3+642k2+360k+72 fork  0.19043
18432k9+112128k8+285920k7+396008k6+323321k5+158528k4+45640k3+7104k2+464k
73728k8+448512k7+1139072k6+1565024k5+1262162k4+608048k3+170608k2+25536k+1568 for k >0.19043
(47)
SC⇤seq =
8>><>>:
32k5+146k4+251k3+205k2+80k+12
128k4+480k3+642k2+360k+72 fork  0.19043
18432k9+123648k8+353792k7+565978k6+557585k5+351011k4+141456k3+35304k2+4976k+304
73728⇤k8+448512⇤k7+1139072⇤k6+1565024⇤k5+1262162k4+608048k3+170608k2+25536k+1568 for k >0.19043
(48)
Proposition 8 summarizes the eﬀect of convex costs on transport, production, and total social cost.
Proposition 8: As k increases
(a) TC⇤ increases until k = 0.19043, decreases until k = 2, and then increases.
(b) PC⇤ increases
(c) SC⇤ increases
Proof: Diﬀerentiate and identify roots for (42) - (44).
Costs under this sequential choice equilibrium locations in (37) and (38) can be compared with costs under
the simultaneous choice equilibrium locations. In simultaneous choice, firms choose the locations derived
previously in equation (6) and total transport, production and social cost are expressed in (13) - (15).
Subtraction these costs in sequential choice from the cost in simultaneous choice yields three long expressions
which are available from the author.The diﬀerence in transport, production, and total social cost between
simultaneous and sequential choice are summarized in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9: Let 4TC = TC⇤seq   TC⇤sim, 4PC = PC⇤seq   PC⇤sim4SC = SC⇤seq   SC⇤sim.
(a) 4TC > 0 8k. @4TC@k > 0 if 0 < k < 0.190; @4TC@k < 0 otherwise.
(b) 4PC > 0 8k. @4PC@k > 0 if 0 < k < 0.190; @4PC@k < 0 otherwise.
(c) 4SC > 0 8k. @4SC@k > 0 if 0 < k < 0.190; @4SC@k < 0 otherwise.
Proof: Set (45) - (47) equal to zero and solve for k. Diﬀerentiate and calculate positive roots of
equations (45) - (47).
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Total transport, production and social cost are always greater under sequential choice than under simulta-
neous choice when there is an upstream monopoly setting the input price.
Additionally, costs of serving the market under sequential entry can be compared with and without
upstream monopoly. Costs are always greater with upstream monopoly than without, yet these cost diﬀerence
diminish as convexity increases. This result is similar to the findings presented in note one.
1.4.2 Summary
In this note, I show that with upstream monopoly and constant marginal cost, locations under sequential
choice are identical to those under simultaneous choice. This is because with simultaneous choice a critical
firm locates at the center of the market to drive down the input price leaving no further advantage of
leadership. This is not the case with convex costs. The leader remains at the center for low degrees of
convexity, but the follower locates further from the center than they would under simultaneous choice. For
higher degrees of convexity, the leader moves away from the center of the market. Costs are always larger
under sequential choice than simultaneous choice.
1.5 Conclusion
In this essay, I explore three inter-related extensions to a model of spatial price discrimination with convex
production costs. These extensions include allowing for upstream monopoly, sequential location choice and
both together. I find that the eﬀect of these additions to the baseline model (with neither upstream monopoly
nor sequential choice) can generate results that would not be anticipated with constant marginal costs. My
findings are organized into three notes.
In the first note, which is also published (Courey, forthcoming), I show that the reduction in social welfare
caused by the presence of an upstream monopoly is lower with convex costs than with constant marginal
cost. This follows because convex costs cause the leader to have less incentive to locate near the center of the
market. Locations become more eﬃcient, though they always remain less eﬃcient than without an upstream
monopoly.
The second note returns to the case without upstream monopoly but allows the firms to locate sequentially
rather than simultaneously. While previous study work shown that sequential entry reduces social welfare
under constant marginal cost, I show that this need not be true when production costs are convex. The
leader moves further from the center of the market and transport cost decreases. In contrast, when firms
locate sequentially and cost convexity is larger both firms locate so far from the center that social welfare
is less than under sequential choice. This mirrors the result with constant marginal costs and no upstream
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monopoly.
In the third note, I investigate the model with both upstream monopoly and sequential choice. I find
that, as in the first note, the distortion in social welfare from upstream monopoly is reduced but always
positive with convex costs. I also find that with upstream monopoly, in contrast to the case without upstream
monopoly in the second note, sequential entry always yields lower social welfare than simultaneous entry.
A possible extension to this analysis is to make endogenous the timing of the game. Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990) consider a pre-game stage in which two firms can choose whether to produce in one of two
sub-stages. If both produce in the same sub-stage the equilibrium is identical to Cournot competition,
and if they produce in diﬀerent sub-stages the equilibrium is identical to Stackelberg. If firms’ payoﬀs are
larger as a Stackelberg follower than with Cournot competition, firms with choose to produce in diﬀerent
sub-stages yielding the Stackelberg equilibrium. Otherwise, the firms will choose to produce in the same
sub-stage yielding the Cournot equilibrium. I have investigated both simultaneous and sequential location
choice timing structures under two diﬀerent types of upstream markets. Since social welfare is sometimes
larger in sequential timing rather than simultaneous, it is potentially interesting to think about whether
firms would choose this structure endogenously. Additionally, their preference of timing structures might
also depend on the upstream market structure.
Another possible extension is to consider the firm’s choice of diﬀerent production costs downstream.
Gupta, Heywood and Pal (1995) show that in the presence of an upstream monopoly, a downstream firm
chooses to adopt an ineﬃciently high transportation cost. Assuming the monopoly’s profit is maximized
when the entire market is served, the higher transport cost causes the monopoly to reduce the input price
in order to accommodate the market. The same thing might be true with production cost convexity: if the
firm can choose the level of k, it might choose an ineﬃciently high level, forcing the input price down and
increasing total profit to the firm.
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Figure 1: Marginal costs, market division, prices and locations
Consumers have reservation price r and pay a price depending on their location denoted by the darkened
line. The indiﬀerent consumer at x⇤ denotes the market division between the firms. Firms 1 and 2 have
locations L1and L2, incur marginal costs of production kx⇤ and k(1  x⇤), and transport cost normalized
to 1. The input price P ⇤u is set by the upstream monopoly.
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Figure 2: Delivered prices and locations
Firms locate at Li and the market division is x⇤. The darkened line is the sum of the rival’s marginal
production and transport cost, and k is the slope of the marginal cost curve.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Locations with Sequential and Simultaneous Location
Sequential locations, L⇤1 and L⇤2, are always to the left of the symmetric simultaneous locations, L⇤⇤1 and
L⇤⇤2 , respectively. Sequential locations are closer together than simultaneous locations. Sequential location
improves social welfare when k > 0.300.
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Table 1: Equilibrium downstream locations and the cost of upstream monopoly
Locations Cost of Upstream Monopoly
k (L⇤1, L⇤2) TC⇤   TCG PC⇤   PCG
0 (0.166, 0.500) 0.0417 0.0000
.1 (0.172, 0.520) 0.0352 0.0020
.2 (0.173, 0.533) 0.0311 0.0030
.3 (0.173, 0.543) 0.0280 0.0036
.5 (0.172, 0.551) 0.0236 0.0041
.75 (0.166, 0.568) 0.0199 0.0043
1 (0.163, 0.576) 0.0172 0.0043
2 (0.155, 0.593) 0.0112 0.0036
5 (0.140, 0.609) 0.0054 0.0022
10 (0.133, 0.616) 0.0029 0.0013
The cost of upstream monopoly is the sum of added transport cost (TC⇤   TCG) and added production
cost (PC⇤   PCG).
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Table 2: Stackelberg equilibrium locations with monopoly upstream
Cost Convexity Locations
k (L⇤F , L
⇤
L)
0 (0.167, 0.500)
.1 (0.166, 0.500)
.1904 (0.165, 0.500)
.2 (0.166, 0.502)
.3 (0.168, 0.520)
.5 (0.168, 0.542)
.75 (0.165, 0.558)
1 (0.162, 0.569)
2 (0.152, 0.590)
5 (0.140, 0.608)
10 (0.133, 0.616)
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2 Gender and Racial Wage Diﬀerentials in the Nonprofit Sector:
Are Hospitals Diﬀerent?
2.1 Introduction
This paper focuses on gender and racial wage diﬀerentials within the enormous US hospital industry. It
contrasts the size of such diﬀerentials in the nonprofit sector with those in the for profit sector. Economists
have long been interested in labor markets which involve nonprofits and question whether the process of
earnings determination mimics that for for-profit firms. While the evidence on relative wage levels between
sectors is ambiguous, it remains very typical to show that nonprofits have lower gender and race diﬀerentials.
My study provides contradictory evidence for hospitals.
I find that both gender and racial wage diﬀerentials are larger among hospital workers in the nonprofit
sector than among hospital workers in the for-profit sector. This result casts doubt on a theory often
used to explain the traditional finding of smaller gender and racial diﬀerentials in the nonprofit sector.
Past researchers have argued that “nonprofit organizations rely disproportionately on intrinsically motivated
employees” (Leete, 2000). They cite a large literature from social sciences linking wage equality and in-
trinsic motivation: when workers feel working conditions are unfair (inequitable), they are less intrinsically
motivated. They conclude that nonprofits, more than for-profits, emphasize wage equality across visible
diﬀerences (including race and gender) as a tool for maintaining their workers’ intrinsic motivation (and/or
attracting workers with such motivation).
This theory appears obviously at odds with my findings of larger race and gender diﬀerentials in the non-
profit sector. Not only do I find larger diﬀerentials for the hospital industry on average, but also throughout
the earnings distribution and in most subsamples. I suggest an alternative theory to explain of these patterns
based on Pauly and Redisch’s (1973) model of nonprofit hospitals as physician cooperatives. In this model,
nonprofit hospitals are associated with weakened monitoring of physicians who make important decisions in
the organization. I argue that one result of this weakened monitoring could be more latitude to indulge in
taste-based discrimination among nonprofit hospitals.
I use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1995 to 2013. After controlling for factors
commonly thought to determine workers’ earnings such as occupation, age and education, I find that in both
the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, Female and Black hospital workers make less on average than Male and
Non-Black hospital workers, respectively. The pay penalties associated with Female and Black workers are
statistically significant in both sectors. Importantly, both diﬀerentials are significantly larger in magnitude
among workers in nonprofit hospitals than among workers in for-profit hospitals.
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Quantile regression estimates reveal that these patterns vary throughout the earnings distribution. The
larger gender diﬀerential in nonprofit hospitals is most strongly experienced by workers at the top of the
earnings distribution. Meanwhile, the larger racial diﬀerential in nonprofit hospitals is most strongly ex-
perienced by workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution. In both sectors, the gender diﬀerential
is larger at the top of the distribution, suggesting that Female hospital workers experience a glass ceiling.
However, Black workers do not seem to experience a glass ceiling as the racial diﬀerential generally decreases
throughout the distribution.
I inspect 20 diﬀerent subsamples based on unionization, part-time, full-time and marital status, race,
gender and occupation. In all 20 subsamples, the gender and racial diﬀerentials are at least as large in the
nonprofit sector as in the for-profit sector. In fact, many subsamples continue to reflect the industry-wide
finding of larger diﬀerentials in the nonprofit sector.
In what follows, I place my study in the related literature and motivate my focus on the US hospital
industry. In section 3, I describe the data used in my analysis. In section 4, I present my approach and
results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Motivation
The study of racial and gender wage diﬀerentials has a long, rich history among economists interested in
labor markets (for a review, see Altonji and Blank, 1999; for a meta-analysis of findings, see Weichselbaumer
and Winter-Ebmer, 2005). Female and Black workers, on average, earn less than their Male and Non-Black
counterparts, after controlling for important earnings determinants. These findings may, but need not be,
the result of discrimination by employers.
Many focal-points have emerged within this vast literature on race and gender wage inequality. Among
them, a growing body of research contrasts the sizes of racial and gender diﬀerentials in the nonprofit sector
with those in the for-profit sector. These studies have routinely found smaller diﬀerentials in the nonprofit
sector as compared to the for-profit sector.
The common theory put forth in the literature is based on a link between the nonprofit sector, intrinsic
motivation and wage inequality. Leete (2000) argues that “nonprofit organizations rely disproportionately on
intrinsically motivated employees” (p. 423). She cites a large literature from social science (e.g. Adams, 1963;
Clark and Oswald, 1996; Deci, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Akerlof, 1982) to support a link between wage
equality and intrinsic motivation. When workers feel working conditions are fair, they are more intrinsically
motivated. She predicts that nonprofits emphasize wage equality as a means to increasing their workers’
intrinsic motivation. Thus, the theory seemingly involves two links: intrinsically motivation is more common
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in the nonprofit sector, and wage equality stimulates these workers’ intrinsic motivation.
The first modern study of racial and gender wage diﬀerentials in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors was
done 15 years ago.14 Leete (2000) uses data from the 1990 US Census and finds that, after controlling for
conventional earnings determinants, gender and racial wage diﬀerentials are smaller in the nonprofit sector.
She shows that these sectoral diﬀerences are statistically significant both economy-wide and in white collar
occupations.
Since then, other researchers have performed similar studies. Narcy (2006) uses French data and employs
an Oaxaca decomposition technique. He finds that gender pay gaps are smaller among workers in the
nonprofit sector than for similar workers in the for-profit sector. Etienne and Narcy (2010) also use French
data and investigate the gender pay gap across the earnings distribution. They also use a decomposition
technique and account for sample selection. They show that gender pay gaps among workers in the nonprofit
sector are smaller across the entire earnings distribution. Yet, they find that after controlling for occupation
the diﬀerential is only smaller in the nonprofit sector at the top of the earnings distribution. Thus, they
conclude that occupational segregation plays a part in explaining the observed gender pay gap. Most recently,
Falk, Edwards, Lewis and McGinnis (2013) use data from the American Community Survey over the time
period 2001 - 2006. They find that gender wage diﬀerentials are smaller in industries with a higher share of
nonprofit workers.
I build on this literature by being the first to study whether the patterns found in past economy-wide
studies also prevail within a single but important industry. Additionally, as opposed to the more recent
economy-wide studies, I analyze racial as well as gender diﬀerentials.
2.2.1 The Case of U.S. Hospitals
The U.S. Hospital industry is extremely large and growing. Healthcare expenditure in the United States is
over 17% of GDP, the largest share claimed by any industry (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2013; henceforth CMS). A third of this expenditure goes to hospitals, the largest of any service within
the industry (American Health Association, 2014b; henceforth AHA). In the last half century, national
expenditure on hospital services has grown from 1.8 to 5.6% of GDP. Over this period, in real per capita
terms, expenditure on hospital services has grown by 460% (CMS, 2013).
Wages for hospital workers is of great and growing interest to both workers and employers. Hospitals
hire more workers (nearly 5.6 million) than any other industry, except for full-service restaurants. In the last
20 years, 1.2 million workers have been added to the hospital workforce. While the share of US workers in
14Much older studies have analyzed racial and gender wage diﬀerentials in the public and private sectors (e.g. Long, 1976;
Smith, 1976).
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hospitals is nearly the same as it was in 1995, the market has grown by over 25%, according to the author’s
calculations (AHA, 2014a).
Nonprofits are particularly important to the hospital industry. Of the 4,999 US Community Registered
Hospitals,15 1,068 are Investor-Owned For-Profit Hospitals and 2,894 are Non-government Not-For-Profit
Hospitals (AHA, 2014a).16 Half of all nonprofit workers in the US are employed in healthcare (Lakdawalla
and Philipson, 2006).
The last 20 years have seen a dramatic rise in private for-profit hospitals. In 1995, there were only 752
for-profit hospitals (AHA, 2014a).17 Whether these workers have received diﬀerent treatment than their
counterparts in the nonprofit sector demands a closer look.
Moreover, hospitals are often regarded as diﬀerent from other industries. Important decision-makers,
physicians, are often not employed by the hospitals they work in. Furthermore, physicians’ ability to influence
service provision is likely stronger in nonprofit hospitals.
“The private, nonprofit hospital has usually been regarded by economists as an organizational
anomaly. In particular, it has been alleged that the predominance of the not-for-profit struc-
ture within the American hospital system is associated with a weakening of the usual market
constraints of competition and profit maximization.” (Pauly and Redisch, 1973, p. 87)
Nonprofit organizations in general are associated with weakened monitoring (Handy and Katz, 1998). The
nonprofits’ objectives are typically more diﬃcult to measure, making it more diﬃcult to monitor whether the
objectives are being achieved. Thus, nonprofit hospitals probably have a harder time monitoring physicians
than for-profit hospitals.
Further, the extent of which monitoring is weakened in nonprofit hospitals is likely greater than in other
types of nonprofits. The hospital-physician relationship exhibits large information asymmetry problems.
Doctors possess a majority of the human capital required for providing quality and cost-eﬀective services.
This human capital is implicitly diﬃcult to monitor.
A possible consequence of this weakened monitoring in nonprofit hospitals is a greater ability of physicians
to indulge taste-based discrimination. Physicians (on average Male and White) may have discriminatory
tastes about who they work with. Certainly, there is a large literature on whether doctors provide diﬀerent
treatment based on the race and gender of their patients (Werner at al. 2005, Liu et al. 2011). Thus, wage
diﬀerentials that reflect the ability to indulge discriminatory taste may be larger in nonprofit hospitals.
15Community Hospitals are non-federal, short-term general and other specific hospitals. Registered Hospitals are those
identified by the AHA as a hospital facility.
16These numbers are from 2012.
17The number of beds in all for-profit hospitals has increased at a comparable rate.
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I adapt Pauly and Redisch’s (1973) model of a nonprofit hospital to illustrate how discriminatory physi-
cians could cause wage diﬀerentials for hospital workers, despite the fact that they often don’t work for the
hospital directly. I make the extreme assumption that physicians enjoy full control of operations in nonprofit
hospitals and so can fully indulge their discriminatory preferences.
Assume a “hospitalization service” has the production function
Q = F (La + Lb) (49)
where La and Lb are non-physician labor of two types (i.e. Black and non-Black, or Female and Male)
whose marginal products of labor are assumed to be identical. Other inputs include physical capital and
physician labor. However, these inputs are not the focus and so are assumed to be constant. It is assumed
that customers pay the full price of the service, PT , which is taken as given.18
As is typical, upon receipt of the service, customers receive two separate bills, one from the hospital and
one for the services of the physician. The nonprofit hospital always sets the total price of its service equal to
the total cost of non-physician labor. If PH is the price of the hospital services not associated with physician
labor, then the hospital always sets PH to break even:
PHQ ⌘ wa(La)La + wb(Lb)Lb (50)
where wi is the wage rate for worker type i. Assume w
0
i(Li) > 0, so each hospital faces an upward sloping
labor supply curve. This could be a result of monopsony power in the labor market or transactions costs
(Hirsch and Schumacher, 1995, 2005).
Thus the income for the physician is
⇡Ph = PTQ  PHQ = PTF (La + Lb)  wa(La)La   wb(Lb)Lb. (51)
As preference over co-workers enters the utility function of the physician, they maximize utility
u = u(Lb,⇡Ph), u1 > 0, u2 > 0. (52)
In the equation (52), the physician prefers working with type b workers. If instead, the physician disliked
working with type a workers, the result would be symmetrical. Holding price constant and diﬀerentiating
18The assumption that customers pay the full price is obviously not realistic but simplifies the analysis. Pauly and Redisch
discuss the eﬀect of insurance on hospital service production and price.
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with respect to non-physician labor yields first-order conditions
PTFL(La + Lb) = wa(La) + w
0
a(La)La = wa(La)

1 +
1
⌘a
 
(53)
PTFL(La + Lb) +
u1
u2
= wb(Lb) + w
0
b(Lb)Lb = wb(Lb)

1 +
1
⌘b
 
(54)
where ⌘i is the wage elasticity of labor supply for worker type i, and I assume ⌘a = ⌘b. On the left-hand
side, PTFL(La + Lb) is the value of the marginal product. The only remaining term is u1u2 which is the
marginal rate of substitution between profit and hiring another type b worker. This term can be thought of
as Becker’s (1957) “coeﬃcient of discrimination.” Since this term is positive, the left hand side of equation
(54) must be greater than the left hand side of equation (54). Subsequently, the same relation must be true
on the right hand side of both equations. This implies that
w⇤b > w
⇤
a. (55)
This inequality is not found in the for-profit hospital, as physicians who have discriminatory tastes can
more easily exert their prejudice within the nonprofit hospital. Additionally, it is unlikely that the theory
can be generalized to all nonprofit industries. It relies on the dual-billing nature of the hospital service
and information issues that are generally absent in other industries. Thus, this predicts that unlike other
industries, wage diﬀerentials in nonprofit hospitals are larger than those in for-profit hospitals. It need not
be the only theory, but it provides at least one alternative to Leete’s theory based on intrinsic motivation.
In the next sections, I show that the observed gender and racial wage diﬀerentials in the nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals are consistent with patterns predicted by the logic just presented.
2.3 Data
I use data from the Merged Outgoing Rotations Group (MORG)19 of the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Every month, 30,000 Americans complete the CPS questionnaire. Each individual participates for four
consecutive month, takes an eight month break and concludes by completing the survey for another four
months. The MORG includes only the final month of each individual’s four month rotation so each individual
appears twice with observations one year apart.
Following Schumacher (2008), I drop observations with imputed wages. Since the imputation process can
involve assigning a nonprofit hospital worker the wages from a for-profit hospital worker, diﬀerentials could
be biased toward zero (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2004). September 1995 is when the CPS began including
19Provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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indicator variables for whether wages were imputed, so I use observations from then until 2013.
After restricting the sample to only hospital workers, Healthcare Practitioners make up more than half
of the sample. Further, more than half of Practitioners are Registered Nurses. I therefore control for
Registered Nurses and “Other Practitioners”20 separately such that all occupation groups are mutually
exclusive. Physicians, Dentists and Veterinarians are excluded from the sample.21Only workers at least 18
years old who report positive earnings and positive weekly hours worked are considered. Workers with wages
between $2.75 and $135 are included in the sample.
Wages are expressed in 2013 dollars. When hourly wages are reported, those are used. Otherwise, weekly
earnings is divided by the reported usual hours worked per week. If usual hours worked per week is not
reported, hours worked last week is used.
The CPS topcodes earnings. Hirsch and Macpherson estimate the mean earnings of those above the cap
assuming a Pareto income distribution.22 I use these estimates to replace the earnings of workers whose
reported incomes are exactly equal to the cap. Roughly 2% of the workers in my sample are topcoded.23
Summary statistics from the two sectors are presented in table 3. Of the 79,482 observations in the
sample, 36,180 are in nonprofit hospitals and 43,302 are in for-profit hospitals. Nonprofit workers are paid
about 10% more than for-profit workers. Nonprofit hospitals hire a smaller share of Female (80%) and Black
(7%) workers than do for-profit hospitals (82 and 13%, respectively).24
[ Table 3 about here ]
Before controlling for other observable characteristics, the raw gender wage gap is larger for workers in
the nonprofit sector (women make 92% as much as men) than for workers in the for-profit sector (95%).
Meanwhile, the raw race wage gap is identical in both sectors. Black hospital workers earn 78% as much
as Non-Black workers in both sectors. In the next section, I show that, after controlling for observable
characteristics, significant diﬀerentials emerge and are larger in the nonprofit sector.
20“Other Practitioners” includes: Chiropractors, Dietitians and nutritionists, Optometrists, Pharmacists, Physician assistants,
Podiatrists; Audiologists, Occupational therapists, Physical therapists, Radiation therapists, Recreational therapists, Respira-
tory therapists, Speech-language pathologists, Exercise physiologists; Therapists, all other; Nurse anesthetists, Nurse midwives,
Nurse practitioners; Health diagnosing and treating practitioners, all other; Clinical laboratory technologists and technicians,
Dental hygienists, Diagnostic related technologists and technicians, Emergency medical technicians and paramedics, Health
diagnosing and treating practitioner support technicians, Licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses, Medical records
and health information technicians; Opticians, dispensing; Miscellaneous health technologists and technicians, Other healthcare
practitioners and technical occupations.
21A hospital’s relationship with Physicians is potentially diﬀerent than with other occupations. The inclusion of these workers
in the sample does not significantly aﬀect my results.
22At http://unionstats.com.
23Dropping workers with topcoded earnings from the sample does not significantly aﬀect my results.
24Descriptive statistics for the economy-wide estimates performed in the next section are available from the author.
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2.4 Approach and Results
In this section, I show that gender and racial wage diﬀerentials are larger in nonprofit hospitals than in
for-profit hospitals. I show this finding is robust to various specifications, and that it exists throughout the
earnings distribution. It also persists in subsamples based on employment and demographic characteristics.
This finding is consistent with the explanation that nonprofit hospitals experience weaker monitoring than
for-profit hospitals but clearly does not prove that explanation.
Consider the log wage equation
lnWi = X
0
i  +Nonprofiti 1 + Femalei 2 +Blacki 3+
+ (Nonprofiti ⇤ Femalei) 4 + (Nonprofiti ⇤Blacki) 5 + ✏i. (56)
Each individual i has real wage Wi , error term ✏i, and a vector X 0i of standard wage determinants including
human capital, demographic and occupational characteristics, region25 and year. Nonprofiti is a dummy
variable which equals 1 if individual i works in the nonprofit sector and 0 if they work in the for-profit
sector, Femalei is a dummy variable which equals 1 if individual i is Female and 0 otherwise, and Blacki
is a dummy which equals 1 if individual i is Black and 0 otherwise. My focus is on weighted least squares
(WLS) estimates of the parameters  2 ,  3 ,  4 and  5, which are the eﬀect of working in the nonprofit
sector on gender and racial wage diﬀerentials. WLS diﬀers from ordinary least squares (OLS) in that each
observation is weighted by the inverse probability of being in the sample. These weights, which focus on the
workers’ state, ethnicity, race and age, approximate the number of people in the population represented by
each observation in the sample.26 Estimates  ˆ2 and  ˆ3 can be transformed to generate gender and racial
wage diﬀerentials for for-profit workers. These estimates can be combined with  ˆ4and  ˆ5, respectively, to
calculate the diﬀerentials for nonprofit workers. For example, the gender wage diﬀerential in the for-profit
sector is calculated as exp( ˆ2) 1. Similarly, the gender diﬀerential in the nonprofit sector is exp( ˆ2+  ˆ4) 1.
[ Table 4 about here ]
Economy-wide results, shown in column 1 of table 4, reveal that in the for-profit sector, Female workers
earn 0.184 less and Black workers earn 0.067 less in log wages. This translates to gender and racial diﬀerentials
25“New England” includes: ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT. “Middle Atlantic” includes: NY, NJ, PA. “East North Central”
includes: OH, IN, IL, MI, WI. “West North Central” includes: MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS. “South Atlantic” includes: DE,
MD, DC, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL. “East South Central” includes: KY, TN, AL, MS. “West South Central” includes: AR,
LA, OK, TX. “Mountain” includes: MT, ID, WY, CO, NM, AZ, UT, NV. “Pacific” includes: WA, OR, CA, AK, HI.
26All standard errors presented in this paper are robust to heteroskedasticity. OLS parameter estimates reflected nearly
identical patterns as those under WLS.
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of -16.8% and -6.5%, as shown in column 2 of table 3. Following this same process reveals diﬀerentials for the
nonprofit sector of -3.9% and -1.2%, as shown in column 1 of table 5. Thus both diﬀerentials are smaller in
the nonprofit sector than in the for-profit sector, economy-wide. This finding confirms that patterns found
in past studies are also present in the data used here.
[ Table 5 about here ]
However, this economy-wide pattern does not exist within the expansive US hospital industry. As shown
in columns 3 and 4 of table 5, for-profit hospitals have gender and racial diﬀerentials of -3.9% and -5.2%,
while those in nonprofit hospitals are -6.9% and -7.6%. Both diﬀerentials are larger in nonprofit hospitals
than in for-profit hospitals. Furthermore, these sectoral diﬀerences are statistically significant, as shown by
 ˆ4 and  ˆ5 in column 2 of table 4. These findings in the hospital industry are consistent with the explanation
that nonprofit hospital experience more discrimination as a result of weaker monitoring.
Furthermore, focusing on all non-hospital workers reveals patterns diﬀerent from the economy-wide find-
ings. As shown in columns 5 and 6 of table 5, the gender and racial diﬀerentials are -16.9% and -6.5% in the
for-profit sector and -5.6% and -1.0% in the nonprofit sector, for non-hospital industries. As can be seen by
a closer look at table 5, the economy-wide diﬀerentials are not always a weighted average of those found in
the hospital and non-hospital subsamples. The economy-wide gender diﬀerential in the nonprofit sector is
-3.9%, while in hospital and non-hospital samples they are -6.9 and -5.6. This suggests the gender diﬀeren-
tial observed in nonprofits economy-wide is the result of composition eﬀects. The composition eﬀect is not
present in the racial diﬀerential for nonprofits (-1.0 in non-hospital, -7.6 in hospital and -1.0 economy-wide).
The for-profit sector exhibits a less dramatic pattern. In the for-profit sector, the racial diﬀerential is the
same in the non-hospital sample as economy-wide (-6.5%). Thus the -5.2% racial diﬀerential found in for-
profit hospitals seems to have no eﬀect in the economy-wide result. The gender diﬀerential in the for-profit
sector economy-wide (-16.8%) is bracketed by its hospital (-3.9%) and non-hospital (-16.9%) subsamples.
The main point remains the surprising finding that among hospitals, race and gender diﬀerentials are larger
in nonprofit hospitals.
These findings in the hospital industry are robust to more flexible wage structures. Equation (56) is
restrictive because the coeﬃcients on the set of controls are assumed to be constant across both sectors. A
more flexible approach estimates the earnings of nonprofit and for-profit hospital workers separately:
lnW ki = X
0k
i  
k + Femaleki  
k
F +Black
k
i  
k
B + ✏
k
i (57)
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where k 2 (Nonprofit, For Profit) denotes the sector. This estimation allows the controls to take diﬀerent
returns by sector. Now  ˆkF and  ˆkB are used on their own to calculate gender and racial wage diﬀerentials
in each sector. Computing the diﬀerentials using the regression results shown in table 4, nonprofit hospitals
have gender and racial diﬀerentials of -6.9% and -6.9%. Meanwhile, in the for-profit sector the gender
diﬀerential is -5.3% and the racial diﬀerential is -5.0%. Furthermore, the estimated premiums for Female
and Black workers are significantly diﬀerent in the two sectors, as shown in column 3 of table 6.27 These
coeﬃcients and the diﬀerences by sector are essentially identical to those found using the more restrictive
equation. Thus, allowing coeﬃcients to diﬀer by sector has very little eﬀect on the results.28
[ Table 6 about here ]
In addition to being impervious to more flexible wage structures, these findings are also present through-
out the earnings distribution. I show this using quantile regression to estimate equations (57). Rows 1 and 2
of table 6 shows the regression results in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and
90th percentiles. At the median, the diﬀerentials are only slightly smaller than those previously estimated
at the mean. Median gender and racial diﬀerentials are -5.6% and -6.7% in nonprofit hospitals, and -2.7%
and -4.5% in for-profit hospitals. As shown in row 3 of table 7, diﬀerences between sectors are statistically
significant at the median. Throughout the distribution, diﬀerentials exhibit a wide range. Gender diﬀeren-
tials at the five quantiles are -0.7% (10th), -4.2% (25th), -5.6% (median), -8.1% (75th) and -12.5% (90th)
in nonprofit hospitals; and 1.4%, 0.1%, -2.7%, -6.1% and -9.4% in for-profits hospitals. Racial diﬀerentials
are -8.5%, -7.8%, -6.7%, -5.4% and -7.8% in nonprofit hospitals; and -6.0%, -5.4%, -4.5%, -3.9% and -3.4%
in for-profit hospitals.
These patterns suggest that Female workers may experience a glass ceiling in both sectors: the gen-
der wage diﬀerential is largest at the highest percentiles. This is similar to the findings of Etienne and
Narcy, who find evidence of a glass ceiling in the French nonprofit and for-profit sectors. Furthermore, this
glass ceiling seems to be more pronounced in nonprofit hospitals. In this sector, diﬀerentials at the 90th
and 10th percentiles are more drastically diﬀerent (12.5%   0.7% = 11.8%) than in the for-profit sector
(10.8%). However, as is typically found, racial diﬀerentials generally decreases throughout the income and
skills distribution (Heywood and Parent, 2012). The racial diﬀerential also seems to exhibit a wider range
27In results not shown, the use of 314 specific occupation controls rather than the 8 broad controls yields similar results.
The time period 1995-2013 does not include consistent occupation categories throughout. The longest span with consistent
occupation categories is 2000-2010. Restricting analysis to only this time period has minimal eﬀect on the results. The
economy-wide patterns shown in table 2 also persist using specification (9).
28Alternatively, one could allow returns to characteristics to diﬀer by race or gender but not by sector. Estimating separate
equations for Female, Male, Black and Non-Black workers reveals that all four groups earn more in nonprofit hospitals than
in for-profits. Nonprofit premiums are larger for Male and Non-Black workers than for Female and Black workers respectively.
The diﬀerence between racial groups is statistically significant. Regression results are available from the author.
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throughout the distribution in the nonprofit sector. Diﬀerences by sector are statistically significant at many
points throughout the distribution, as shown in row 3 of table 7. This more detailed investigation of various
quantiles shows that findings at the mean also appear throughout the distribution: diﬀerentials are larger in
nonprofit hospitals than in for-profit hospitals.
[ Table 7 about here ]
To further strengthen this finding, I show it is also robust in most subsamples. Estimates of (9) within
many relevant employment and demographic sub-samples are shown in table 6. Both union and non-union
workers experience larger diﬀerentials in nonprofit hospitals than in for-profit hospitals, as shown in rows 1
and 2. Union workers experience gender diﬀerentials of -2.8% in nonprofit hospitals and -0.3% in for-profit
hospitals, and those for non-union workers are -7.1% and -4.4%, respectively. Union workers experience racial
diﬀerentials of -2.6% in the nonprofit sector and -3.4% in the for-profit sector, while non-union workers ex-
perience diﬀerentials of -8.2% and -5.4%, respectively.29 The diﬀerences by sector are statistically significant
for non-union workers but not for union workers.
Both full-time and part-time workers experience significantly larger diﬀerentials in the nonprofit hospitals.
For full-time workers, gender diﬀerentials are -7.8% in nonprofits and -5.2% in for-profits, while for part-time
workers gender diﬀerential are -2.1% and 1.0%, respectively. Racial diﬀerentials for full-time workers are
-7.5% (nonprofit) and -4.9% (for-profit), while racial diﬀerentials for part-time workers are -8.8% and -6.2%,
respectively. The diﬀerences by sector are significant for full-time worker, while for part-time workers the
gender diﬀerential is statistically diﬀerent by sector.
Married and unmarried workers both have larger diﬀerentials in nonprofit hospitals than in for-profit
hospitals. Gender diﬀerentials for married workers are -8.2% in nonprofit hospitals and -6.0% in for-profit
hospitals, while gender diﬀerentials for unmarried hospital workers are -4.5% and -0.8%, respectively.30 For
both married and unmarried workers, gender diﬀerentials in nonprofit hospitals are significantly larger than
in for-profit hospitals. Married workers have significantly larger racial diﬀerentials in nonprofits (-9.9%)
than in for-profit hospitals (-5.7%). Racial diﬀerentials for unmarried workers are larger but not significantly
so in nonprofits (-6.2% versus -5.3% in for-profits). Critically, among all six of these sub-samples (based
on marriage, full-time and union status), the estimated diﬀerentials are larger in nonprofit hospitals than
for-profit hospitals. This confirms the study’s main finding and shows that it is spread broadly across those
with diﬀerent workforce characteristics.
29Larger racial gaps among non-union workers is consistent with other recent findings in the healthcare industry (McGregory
Jr., 2013).
30Larger gender diﬀerentials for married workers has also been found in numerous past studies (Blau, Ferber and Winkler,
2014).
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[ Table 8 about here ]
Occupational categories also provide strong supporting evidence of the breadth of the finding. Gender
and racial diﬀerentials for 8 mutually exclusive categories (Management, Professional, RN’s, Other Prac-
titioners, Service, Oﬃce, Operative and Transportation) generate 16 total race and gender diﬀerentials in
each sector. In all of these, the diﬀerentials in nonprofit hospitals are larger or no diﬀerent than those in
for-profit hospitals. As rows 7 through 14 of table 8 show, both gender and racial diﬀerentials are larger
or not statistically diﬀerent in all occupational category. The gender diﬀerential for Other Practitioners is
-4.5% in nonprofit hospitals and significantly smaller -1.6% in for-profit hospitals. For Oﬃce workers, gender
diﬀerentials are -5.0% in nonprofit hospitals and a significantly smaller -2.0% in for-profit hospitals. The
most pronounced diﬀerence for gender is among Professional Non-Practitioners where the gender diﬀerential
is -12.9% in nonprofit hospitals and a significantly smaller -4.1% in for-profit hospitals. Professional Non-
Practitioners also represent the largest diﬀerence for race, with a diﬀerential of -12.5% in nonprofit hospitals
and a significantly smaller -3.4% in for-profit hospitals. The racial diﬀerential for Service workers are sig-
nificantly larger in nonprofit hospitals (-6.7%) than in for-profits (-0.6%).31 In summary, these findings in
occupational subsamples provide a variety of estimates but broadly support the main finding that gender and
racial wage diﬀerentials tend to be significantly larger in nonprofit hospitals than in for-profit hospitals.32
[ Table 9 about here]
Race and gender sub-samples have unique benefits that warrant a closer investigation. Since gender and
race are the focus of this study, these sub-samples allow us to examine one diﬀerential (say, race) within
subsamples based on the other (gender). For the first time in this study, returns to all characteristics are
allowed to vary by race or gender, the two focal groups. As shown in table 9,33 Black workers have gender
diﬀerentials of -4.1% in nonprofit hospitals and -1.4% in for-profit hospitals, while Non-Black workers have
gender diﬀerentials of -7.0% in nonprofits and -4.4% in for-profit hospitals.34 As shown in column 3, these
31A majority of Service workers are in “Health Aid” occupations: Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides; Occupational
therapist assistants and aides, Physical therapist assistants and aides, Massage therapists, Dental assistants, Medical assistants,
Medical transcriptionists, Pharmacy aides, Veterinary assistants and laboratory animal caretakers, Phlebotomists; Miscellaneous
healthcare support occupations, including medical equipment preparers. Dividing Service workers into Health Aids and all other
Service workers does not have large eﬀects on the findings. As shown in the last two rows of table 6, the significantly larger
racial diﬀerential in nonprofit hospitals is found among the Service workers not in Health Aid occupations.
32In addition to these occupational categories and demographic sub-samples, I investigate 19 annual sub-samples. Patterns
over the time period show no secular trends and are generally consistent with the main finding of larger diﬀerentials in the
nonprofit sector. In 18 of the 19 annual sub-samples, the gender diﬀerential in nonprofit hospitals is at least as large as that
in for-profit hospitals. In all 19 annual sub-samples the racial diﬀerential in nonprofit hospitals is at least as large as that in
for-profit hospitals.
33A full table of estimates are available from the author.
34Larger gender gaps for Non-Black workers is consistent with patterns found in other studies (Blau et. al, 2014).
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diﬀerences by sector are statistically significant for Non-Black hospital workers. Racial diﬀerentials for Males
are -10.9% in nonprofit hospitals and -6.1% in for-profit hospitals, while racial diﬀerentials for Females are
-6.9% and -5.1%, respectively.35 These gender gaps are significantly larger in nonprofit hospitals for both
Males and Females. Thus, these findings reveal that significantly larger racial diﬀerentials in nonprofit
hospitals is attributable to both genders, while significantly larger gender diﬀerentials in nonprofit hospitals
is disproportionately attributed to Non-Black workers.
2.5 Conclusion
In this study of the US hospital industry, I find that both gender and racial wage diﬀerentials are significantly
larger among hospital workers in the nonprofit sector than among hospital workers in the for-profit sector. I
use quantile regression to show that this pattern shows up throughout the earnings distribution, and not only
at the industry mean. Consistent with past research, I find evidence of a glass ceiling for Female workers
in both the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. I also show that larger diﬀerentials in nonprofit hospitals is
found in a broad range of occupational categories and demographic groups. I present 36 gender and racial
diﬀerentials in each sector, and show that in all of these, nonprofit hospitals have diﬀerentials larger or no
smaller than those in for-profit hospitals. To provide one possible explanation for these findings, I suggest
that physicians may be more able to indulge discriminatory tastes in nonprofit hospitals than in for-profit
hospitals.
The nonprofit sector is often associated with weakened monitoring. Nonprofits typically are thought to
maximize an objective other than profit. It is diﬃcult for owners to know whether their firm’s objective is
being met because the objective is relatively diﬃcult to observe. I argue that one implication of this weakened
monitoring in nonprofit hospitals is physicians’ ability to indulge in taste-based discrimination. Physicians
influence production decisions in nonprofit hospitals, even though they often are not hospital employees.
The greater ability to indulge discrimination in nonprofit hospitals can generate larger wage diﬀerentials.
One reason that the logic used to explain my findings does not fit with past economy-wide studies may be
related to the unique dual-billing nature of the hospital industry and the relationship between physicians
and hospitals.
The findings that nonprofit hospitals have larger diﬀerentials than for-profit hospitals reveals an opposite
pattern from what has been found in past economy-wide studies. Past researchers have found that gender
and racial wage diﬀerentials are significantly smaller among workers in the nonprofit sector as compared
with workers in the for-profit sector. To explain these findings, they suggest that nonprofits emphasize wage
35Larger racial diﬀerentials among Male relative to Female workers is consistent with commonly observed patterns (Blau et.
al, 2014).
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equality along race and gender lines because their employees care more about fairness. Thus, this theory is
not consistent with my findings in the US hospital industry.
Finally, this study is the first modern study of racial and gender diﬀerentials that contrasts nonprofits and
for-profits within a single industry. Critically, I find that one of the largest American industries demonstrates
patterns inconsistent with the economy as a whole. This brings into question whether or not other industries
might also demonstrate patterns more similar to those found in hospitals. Further work might investigate
whether the findings in hospitals point to a wider trend or remain unique.
42
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Sector
Variable Nonprofit Sector For-Profit Sector
Observations 36,180 43,302
Log(Wage) 3.126 (0.479) 3.034 (0.493)
Demographics:
Female 80.4% 82.4%
Black 7.3% 12.7%
Age 43.43 (11.71) 41.11 (11.74)
Currently Married 63.8% 62.6%
Past Married 17.6% 17.7%
Metropolitan 74.95% 80.2%
Education:
No College 18.7% 22.8%
Some College 39.6% 41.5%
Bachelor’s Degree 30.1% 27.3%
Graduate Degree 11.6% 8.4%
Occupation:
Management 9.8% 6.9%
Professional (non-Practitioner) 6.6% 4.3%
Professional (RN) 29.7% 29.4%
Professional (Other Practitioner) 20.5% 21.1%
Service 14.6% 19.1%
Oﬃce 16.1% 16.9%
Operative 1.7% 1.1%
Transportation 1.1% 1.1%
Union 10.8% 11.9%
Part Time 28.6% 26.2%
43
Table 4: Log Wage Regression Coeﬃcients
Variable Economy-wide Hospital Only Non-Hospital
Nonprofit*Female 0.144*** -0.031*** 0.127***
(SE) (0.0033) (0.0076) (0.0037)
Nonprofit*Black 0.055*** -0.026*** 0.076***
(0.0047) (0.0089) (0.0054)
Nonprofit -0.227*** 0.065*** -0.268***
(0.0029) (0.0071) (0.0032)
Female -0.184*** -0.040*** -0.185***
(0.0009) (0.0054) (0.0009)
Black -0.067*** -0.053*** -0.067***
(0.0013) (0.0054) (0.0013)
Some College 0.142*** 0.160*** 0.139***
(0.0009) (0.0037) (0.0009)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.367*** 0.296*** 0.371***
(0.0013) (0.0047) (0.0014)
Graduate Degree 0.567*** 0.502*** 0.574***
(0.0021) (0.0069) (0.0022)
Age 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.041***
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0002)
Age2/100 -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.042***
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002)
Management 0.408*** 0.469*** 0.407***
(0.002) (0.0146) (0.0016)
Professional (non-Practitioner) 0.294*** 0.245*** 0.302***
(0.0017) (0.0152) (0.0017)
Professional (RN) 0.571*** 0.550*** 0.484***
(0.0025) (0.0137) (0.0040)
Professional (Other Practitioner) 0.355*** 0.306*** 0.340***
(0.0025) (0.0136) (0.0031)
Service -0.166*** -0.066*** -0.173***
(0.0013) (0.0134) (0.0013)
Oﬃce 0.092*** 0.043*** 0.093***
(0.0012) (0.0135) (0.0012)
Operative 0.129*** 0.250*** 0.128***
(0.0014) (0.0172) (0.0014)
Union 0.235*** 0.074*** 0.242***
(0.0013) (0.0041) (0.0014)
Part Time -0.134*** -0.009*** -0.137***
(0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0009)
Currently Married 0.109*** 0.044*** 0.111***
(0.0011) (0.0039) (0.0011)
Past Married 0.046*** 0.0081* 0.047***
(0.0014) (0.0047) (0.0014)
Metropolitan 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.108***
(0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0010)
Constant 1.533*** 1.624*** 1.538***
(0.0046) (0.0228) (0.0047)
N 1,666,427 79,486 1,586,941
R2 0.482 0.585 0.478
Superscripts ***, **, and * denote coeﬃcients are statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level. Sector-specific regressions also include controls for Region and Year.
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Table 5: Gender and Racial Diﬀerentials Economy-Wide, Hospital Only, and Non-Hospital
Economy-wide Hospital Only Non-Hospital
Nonprofit For-profit Nonprofit For-profit Nonprofit For-profit
Gender -3.9 -16.8 -6.9 -3.9 -5.6 -16.9
Race -1.2 -6.5 -7.6 -5.2 -1.0 -6.5
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Table 6: Log-Wage Regression Coeﬃcients by Sector
Hospitals Only
Variable Nonprofit Sector For-Profit Sector Diﬀerence = NP - FP
Female -0.069*** -0.041*** -0.029***
(SE) (0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0081)
Black -0.080*** -0.054*** -0.026***
(0.0077) (0.0056) (0.0095)
Some College 0.157*** 0.161*** -0.003
(0.0057) (0.0048) (0.0074)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.296*** 0.294*** 0.002
(0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0095)
Graduate Degree 0.490*** 0.512*** -0.022
(0.0096) (0.0100) (0.0139)
Age 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.007***
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0016)
Age2/100 -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.006***
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0019)
Management 0.454*** 0.480*** -0.026
(0.0197) (0.0209) (0.0287)
Professional (non-Practitioner) 0.244*** 0.241*** 0.003
(0.0205) (0.0219) (0.0300)
Professional (RN) 0.539*** 0.558*** -0.019
(0.0186) (0.0194) (0.0268)
Professional (Other Practitioner) 0.309*** 0.303*** 0.006
(0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0268)
Service -0.070*** -0.063*** -0.007
(0.0182) (0.0190) (0.0262)
Oﬃce 0.038** 0.044** -0.006
(0.0183) (0.0191) (0.0265)
Operative 0.242*** 0.255*** -0.014
(0.0231) (0.0251) (0.0341)
Union 0.054*** 0.088*** -0.034***
(0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0083)
Part Time -0.007* -0.011*** 0.004
(0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0060)
Currently Married 0.038*** 0.050*** -0.012
(0.0057) (0.0052) (0.0078)
Past Married 0.001 0.013** -0.012
(0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0094)
Metropolitan 0.119*** 0.108*** 0.011*
(0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0065)
Constant 1.607*** 1.677*** -0.071
(0.0342) (0.0300) (0.0455)
N 36,184 43,302 79,486
R2 0.584 0.580 0.586
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Table 7: Female and Black Coeﬃcients at 5 Quantiles
Quantile
10 25 50 75 90
Female -0.007 -0.043*** -0.058*** -0.084*** -0.134***
Nonprofit (SE) (0.0086) (0.0072) (0.0064) (0.0075) (0.0101)
Black -0.089*** -0.081*** -0.069*** -0.056*** -0.081***
(0.0087) (0.0094) (0.0078) (0.0073) (0.0102)
Female 0.014** 0.001 -0.027*** -0.063*** -0.098***
For-Profit (0.0136) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0073) (0.0098)
Black -0.062*** -0.055*** -0.046*** -0.040*** -0.035***
(0.0061) (0.0069) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0094)
Female -0.021* -0.043*** -0.031*** -0.021** -0.036***
Diﬀerence (NP-FP) (0.0107) (0.0095) (0.0081) (0.0104) (0.0134)
Black -0.027** -0.026** -0.023** -0.016 -0.046***
(0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0095) (0.0010) (0.0141)
Table 8: Employment and Demographic Sub-Samples
Sub-Sample (NP obs.; FP obs.) Variable Nonprofit Sector For-Profit Sector Diﬀerence
Union (3,900; 5,173) Female -0.028* -0.003 -0.025
Black -0.026 -0.035** 0.008
Non-Union (32,280; 38,129) Female -0.074*** -0.045*** -0.029***
Black -0.086*** -0.055*** -0.031***
Full-Time (25,826; 31,942) Female -0.081*** -0.053*** -0.028***
Black -0.078*** -0.050*** -0.028***
Part-Time (10,354; 11,361) Female -0.021 0.010 -0.032***
Black -0.092*** -0.064*** -0.028
Married (23,081; 27,118) Female -0.086*** -0.062*** -0.023**
Black -0.104*** -0.059*** -0.044***
Unmarried (13,099; 16,184) Female -0.046*** -0.008 -0.037***
Black -0.064*** -0.054*** -0.010
Management (3,526; 3,008) Female -0.134*** -0.158*** 0.024
Black -0.128*** -0.094*** -0.034
Professional: Non-Practitioner Female -0.138*** -0.041* -0.097***
(2,376; 1,867) Black -0.134*** -0.035 -0.100***
Professional: Registered Nurse Female 0.011 0.021* -0.011
(10,760; 12,730) Black -0.037* -0.075*** 0.038
Professional: Other Practitioner Female -0.045*** -0.016 -0.030*
(7,402; 9,132) Black -0.102*** -0.105*** 0.003
Service (5,266; 8,292) Female -0.032*** -0.029*** -0.003
Black -0.069*** -0.006 -0.063***
Oﬃce (5,818; 7,306) Female -0.062*** -0.011 -0.051**
Black -0.036 -0.015 -0.021
Operative (604; 493) Female -0.193*** -0.214*** 0.022
Black -0.249** -0.120** -0.129
Transportation (417; 473) Female -0.095*** -0.149*** 0.053
Black -0.110** -0.107** -0.003
Service (Health Aids) Female -0.006 -0.009 0.003
(3,147; 5,020) Black -0.058*** -0.024** -0.034
Service (non- Health Aid) Female -0.126*** -0.128*** 0.001
(2,119; 3,272) Black -0.066*** 0028* -0.092***
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Table 9: Race and Gender Sub-Samples
Sub-Sample (NP obs.; FP obs.) Variable Nonprofit Sector For-Profit Sector Diﬀerence
Black (8,123) Female -0.042** -0.014 -0.029
Non-Black (71,359) Female -0.073*** -0.045*** -0.028***
Female (64,755) Black -0.072*** -0.052*** -0.020*
Male (14,727) Black -0.115*** -0.063*** -0.052**
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2.6 Appendix
In this section, I summarize the two links in Leete’s theory explaining less wage equality in the nonprofit
sector: intrinsically motivation is more common in the nonprofit sector, and wage equality stimulates workers’
intrinsic motivation. I provide a few theories for why this explanation is not consistent with the findings of
this study in the US hospital industry.
2.6.1 On Expectations of Wage Equality and Nonprofits
Leete’s theory explains less wage equality in the nonprofit sector compared with the for-profit sector. She
argues that (1) intrinsically motivated workers are more common in the nonprofit sector, and (2) wage
equality stimulates workers’ intrinsic motivation. Thus nonprofit are more likely to emphasize wage equality
as a way of stimulating their employees. Each of these two links I summarize in turn.
Intrinsic Motivation in Nonprofits Intrinsic motivation means doing something because it is fun or
interesting on its own (Deci and Ryan, 2000). For example, some people exercise simply because they enjoy
it. Many others, however, exercise out of guilt or value being healthy or identify as “someone who exercises.”
These latter reasons are not examples of intrinsic motivation.
If a worker receives a non-monetary reward from an action, they might or might not be intrinsically mo-
tivated. There are many non-monetary motivators including prestige or altruism. However, doing something
in order to improve your reputation (prestige) or in order to improve someone else’s well-being (altruism)
are not intrinsic motivation because the reward is not only in the action itself. Nonetheless, they are all
examples of non-monetary, or non-pecuniary, rewards.
A number of theoretical economists have noted that nonprofit organizations attract workers with intrinsic
motivation or, more generally, nonpecuniary preferences. Critically, some of these theories do not rely on
the service being provided but simply on the organizational form. Nonprofit organizations are, by definition
subject to a nondistribution constraint: profits cannot be distributed to owners, managers or other workers.
Nonprofits may “[screen] selectively for a class of entrepreneurs, managers, and employees who are more
interested in providing high-quality service and less interested in financial reward” (Hansmann, 1980, p. 876).
These workers are more likely to be trusted to adhere to the nondistribution constraint. This explanation
does not depend on the service being provided but is simply a result of the organizational form. Another
feature of nonprofit organizations that has been thought to attract intrinsically motivated workers is a
principal-agent problem between unpaid trustees, managers and employees (Handy and Katz, 1998). Since
nonprofit trustees do not observe the day-to-day operations and want to hire workers they can trust, they are
more likely to hire managers and workers who are intrinsically motivated. Again, this explanation does not
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depend on the service being provided but is only a result of the organizational form. Alternatively, workers
with intrinsic motivation may be attracted to nonprofit organizations if they provide a unique service. If
some workers value the social benefit provided by nonprofit organizations, they may be willing to work for
a lower wage in that sector (Preston, 1989).
Other researchers have argued that entrepreneurs with nonpecuniary preferences are more likely to choose
the nonprofit form instead of for-profit. The nonprofit form may be superior for “a person with strong beliefs
about the proper way to provide a particular service” because of freedom from control of stake-holders (Rose-
Ackerman, 1996, p. 719). Another reason is that if workers value their level of output in addition to profit,
they are more willing to restrict their output as required by the nondistribution constraint, in exchange for
more production (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 1998, 2006). In both of the explanations, the entrepreneur does
not prefer the nonprofit form because of the service being provided but because of the organizational form
itself. In an eﬃciency wage setting, entrepreneurs (principles) with nonpecuniary preferences might expe-
rience free-riding among employees (agents) who shirk knowing the benevolent entrepreneur will complete
the job (Ghatak and Mueller, 2011; Francois, 2000, 2003). In this framework, the nonprofit form limits the
entrepreneur’s profit, reducing their incentive to complete an unfinished project, thereby eliminating shirking
by employees.
All of these theories suggest reasons why workers with nonpecuniary preferences are more likely to be
found in the nonprofit sector than the for-profit sector. It is possible (though not certain) that the non-
pecuniary preferences in all these models are, in fact, intrinsic motivation. Indeed, Leete (2000) and Etienne
and Narcy (2010) cite the above predictions by Hansmann, Handy and Katz, Preston, and Rose-Ackerman
as motivation their argument that intrinsically motivated workers are disproportionately common in the
nonprofit sector.
Intrinsic Motivation and Wage Inequality Intrinsic motivation is costly. Frey (1993) argues that a
worker has a choice of how intrinsically motivated they will be for a given task. A high level implies the work
is done because is it fun and interesting, while a low level implies it is done for other reasons. A worker’s
equilibrium level of intrinsic motivation for a given task is found when the marginal cost of being intrinsically
motivated equals its marginal benefit.
Many factors can aﬀect a worker’s equilibrium level of intrinsic motivation by shifting the costs and
benefits. Monetary rewards can aﬀect intrinsic motivation either positively or negatively. Following Deci
and Ryan (1980), Frey lays out three ways that a monetary reward can decrease workers’ intrinsic motivation.
A reward will decrease intrinsic motivation if (a) it causes the worker to feel less recognized by the employer,
(b) the worker does not feel the employer recognizes how the task was performed, or (c) the worker feels the
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reward is unfair.
Leete (2000) and others have focused on this third determinant of intrinsic motivation, perceptions of fair
rewards. Through this channel, employers can maintain workers’ intrinsic motivation by attempting to keep
monetary rewards fair. One relatively straightforward dimension of fairness is equality. Thus, she claims
that if workers perceive that their employers are successful at emphasizing equality, they will be remain
intrinsically motivated on the job.
There are many ways that monetary rewards can be perceived as fair or unfair. Wage dispersion across
or within various groups of workers has the potential to be perceived as unfair. Other monetary non-wage
rewards like fringe benefits and bonuses are also ways that organizations can fail or succeed at compensating
workers equally. The eﬀect of bonuses on perceived fairness could work in either direction. Some workers
might think that it is only fair for workers to be paid bonuses based on their performance, tenure or other
inputs. Alternatively, bonuses tend to increase wage dispersion among similar workers and so might be
considered unfair. Leete (2000) and others have focused on wage diﬀerentials based on gender, and to a
lesser extent, race, as measures of fair monetary reward. They argue that wage equality reflected in smaller
gender and racial diﬀerentials help to maintain workers’ intrinsic motivation.
Discussion: Findings from the Hospital Industry There are at least four possible reasons why
Leete’s theory falls short of explaining my findings in the hospital industry. First, gender and racial wage
diﬀerentials are only two of many measures of unequal compensation. For example, wage dispersion, firm-
wide or within occupation or education level, could be emphasized. Non-wage rewards like bonuses, fringe
benefits or job related perquisites are also ways of measuring equality of compensation among workers. It
is possible that while nonprofit hospitals do no emphasize wage equality along race and gender lines, they
emphasize equality in other areas. Bonuses, which typically increase wage dispersion, have been found to be
less commonly used by nonprofit hospitals than for-profit hospitals to compensate executives (Ballou and
Weisbrod, 2003; Roomkin and Weisbrod, 1999). Therefore, not using bonuses seem to be another way that
nonprofit hospital emphasize equitable compensation.
Second, equality is not the only measure of fairness. Nonprofit hospitals may attempt to be fair to their
workers in ways other than equitable compensation. Performance based pay may not generate equal pay to
similar workers, but it might still be considered fair.
Third, perceived fairness may not be the relevant stimulator of workers’ intrinsic motivation. Frey (1993)
reference organizational psychologists Deci and Ryan (1980) who lay out three main factors. In addition
to perceived fairness, recognition by the employer and their appreciation of how the task was performed
also boost workers’ intrinsic motivation. If these motivators are substitutes for perceived fairness, nonprofit
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hospitals might use them to motivate their employees instead of reducing race and gender wage diﬀerentials.
Fourth, it could be that hospitals are diﬀerent and nonprofit hospitals simply do not attract more in-
trinsically motivated workers than for-profit hospitals. This might make sense if the services are essentially
the same. If nonprofit hospital workers are willing to work for less, all else equal, then it is possible they
are more intrinsically motivated (Etienne and Narcy, 2010). Schumacher (2008) uses CPS data from 1995 -
2006 to study relative wage levels of US hospital workers in various occupation groups. After controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity in a fixed-eﬀects model, he finds no significant diﬀerence in wage levels between
the two sectors. These findings casts doubt on the notion that hospital workers in the nonprofit sector, as
compared to those in the for-profit sector, are more intrinsically motivated. Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999)
compare earnings of upper-level managers in nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. They find that nonprofit
hospital executives are paid significantly lower salaries than executives in for-profit hospitals. It is possible
that this pattern reflects more intrinsically motivated executives in nonprofit hospitals.
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3 Nonprofit Status Choice in a Duopoly
3.1 Introduction
Important industries such as healthcare, education and the arts involve mixed markets where both nonprofits
and for-profits provide services. Economists interested in these markets have given substantial attention to
at least two common observations: (1) markets involving nonprofits are often imperfectly competitive (for
hospitals, e.g., see Cutler et. al 2013) and so are modeled as Cournot, and (2) nonprofit status is voluntary
and constrains profit to zero (Lakdawalla and Philipson 1998, 2006). Yet, surprisingly, these observations
have not been studied together.
While economists have modeled a Cournot duopoly between a nonprofit and a for-profit firm, they have
taken nonprofit status to be exogenous (Sansing 2000, Lien 2002, Goering 2007, 2008a, Ferreira 2009, Skak
2006 2011, Unfried 2012). Meanwhile, others model endogenous nonprofit status without incorporating the
strategic rivalry between firms (Glaeser and Schleifer 2001, Francois 2003, Lakdawalla and Philipson 1998
2006, Ghatak and Mueller 2011, Bubb and Kaufman 2013). For the first time, I model a Cournot duopoly
in which firms choose nonprofit status in the face of its accompanying zero profit constraint.
When both firms maximize a weighted average of profit and consumer surplus, outputs can be strategic
compliments. A firm deciding to adopt nonprofit status will increase output to meet the constraint of
zero profits and is rewarded by a further increase in output by the for-profit rival. This can result in an
endogenously chosen mixed market despite identical objective functions of the two firms and so provides an
explanation for the presence of such markets.
This research adds to the literature seeking to explain the emergence of mixed markets. Lakdawalla and
Philipson (1998, 2006) argue that one explanation for the emergence of a mixed market is that firms choose
diﬀerent status because they have diﬀerent objective functions. In their model, nonprofit status involves a
zero profit constraint and lower production costs than a for-profit firm. They show that profit-maximizing
firms gain nothing from nonprofit status since the reduced cost cannot be used to increase profit. However,
a firm that places value on output is rewarded with more output by adopting nonprofit status. While they
focus on perfect competition, they argue, but do not show, that the same logic can be applied to imperfectly
competitive markets. Whereas they focus on the incentive from reduced production cost, I allow both costs
and objective functions to remain the same regardless of nonprofit status choice.
In this paper, I assume firms maximize a weighted average of consumer surplus and profit. This assump-
tion is common in the literature on corporate social responsibility (Lambertini and Tampieri 2010, Kopel
and Brand 2012, Nakamura 2013 2014, Kopel 2015). Firms have identical weights and identical increasing
marginal cost curves. Firms simultaneously choose between nonprofit and for-profit status, where nonprofit
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status requires a zero profit constraint, and then engage in Cournot competition.
When the weight on consumer surplus is large enough output levels become strategic compliments. In
this case, when a firm chooses nonprofit status and increases output to satisfy the zero profit constraint, the
for-profit rival responds by also increasing output. This response can be large enough to oﬀset the nonprofit’s
reduced profit thus incentivizing the nonprofit choice. For its part, the for-profit firm has no incentive to
become a second nonprofit firm. If it were to increase output to satisfy the zero profit constraint, the first
nonprofit would reduce output to continue accommodating its own zero profit constraint. Thus, the incentive
to choose nonprofit status exists for one firm while being absent for the other. In this way, an endogenously
chosen mixed market emerges even among firms with identical weights on consumer surplus.
The endogenous mixed market is never socially superior to both the for-profit market and the nonprofit
market. The social welfare function need not equally weight producer surplus and consumer surplus. When
the weight on consumer surplus is relatively high, the nonprofit market is socially optimal, and when the
weight on consumer surplus is low, the for-profit market is socially optimal.
Following this presentation, I consider the eﬀect of incorporating a nonprofit tax-exemption. I assume
the government takes a lump-sum tax from for-profit firms but not from nonprofits. I identify the range of
tax-exemption levels that generate an endogenous mixed market. I show that such a tax policy can expand
the range of parameter values in which an endogenous mixed market emerges.
Finally, I endogenize the nonprofit tax-exemption. When the government chooses the socially optimal
level of tax-exemption, the mixed market can arise endogenously and be the socially optimal market type.
Tax revenue can benefit society if it is potentially transferred to consumers. I show that tax revenue in the
mixed market can be greater than the other market types. Thus, while welfare in the mixed market ranks
second or third without a tax-exemption, it can rank first with a tax-exemption because of the additional
benefit from tax revenue. This result provides an explanation for the presence of mixed markets in US
market such as the arts, education and healthcare.
The underlying assumption of firms with positive weights on consumer surplus is consistent with a large
and growing literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Many researchers assume that for-profit
CSR firms maximize a combination of profit and consumer surplus (Lambertini and Tampieri 2010, Kopel
and Brand 2012, Nakamura 2013 2014, Kopel 2015).36 For example, CSR is a key ingredient of hospital
governance (Brandão et. al 2013, Russo 2016) and has been shown to increase both hospital quality and
36Equilibrium capacity choices have been found to depend on the degree of substitutability and the CSR firm’s weight on
consumer surplus (Nakamura 2014). Allowing for endogenous mode of competition, either price or quantity competition can
arise depending on the CSR weight on consumer surplus and the degree of competition (Kopel 2015). The welfare implications
of competition mode depends on the CSR’s weight on consumer surplus (Nakamura 2013). Both the profit-maximizing and CSR
firms have incentive to delegate decisions to managers (Kopel and Brand 2012). If production involves a negative externality, a
CSR firm that internalizes the externality earns higher profit than the profit-maximizing rival and can improve social welfare
(Lambertini and Tampieri 2010).
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social welfare (Xu 2014). Goering (2008b) shows that a CSR firm chooses to produce less durable goods
than its profit-maximizing rival.
Firms may take on CSR strategies for a variety of reasons. These include socially concerned shareholders,
managers or consumers (Baron 2008). A recent surge in research has examined the theoretical conditions that
cause Cournot competitors to adopt objective functions based on both profitability and consumer surplus
(Hino and Zennyo 2017, Fanti and Boccella 2016 2017a 2017b 2017c, Manasakis et al 2014, Planer-Friedrich
and Marco 2017).
More generally, philanthropy performed by for-profit firms is widespread. Google has created its own
philanthropy division (Reiser 2009). Some states have passed legislation granting tax-exemption to socially-
oriented for-profit enterprises called Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies (L3C) (Hines, Horwitz and
Nichols 2010). This blurs the lines characterizing nonprofit and for-profit firms. Yet a defining feature is the
zero profit constraint that nonprofits must adhere to. This paper examines the eﬀect of such a constraint
on the choice of organizational form in a duopoly. I follow the CSR literature and model firms that value
consumer surplus. I find that for a range of weights on consumer surplus one firm chooses nonprofit status
and the other remains for-profit.
In what follows, I first summarize the related literature. In Section 3, I present the model and solution.
In Section 4, I discuss welfare implications. Section 5 analyzes the eﬀect of a nonprofit tax-exemption. In
Section 6, I endogenize the nonprofit tax-exemption. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper models nonprofit status choice in a Cournot duopoly and derives conditions under which an
endogenous mixed market can occur. Reviewing the literature shows why this contribution is unique. One
strand of literature studies nonprofit status choice without considering the strategic interaction of firms.
Another strand studies imperfectly competitive markets involving nonprofit firms, but takes status to be
exogenous. I summarize both of these strands in turn.
Nonprofit status choice has long been a focal point for researchers. The hospital industry often motivates
the literature on nonprofit organization. Expenditures on hospital services are 5.6% of GDP (American
Health Association 2014a), and as early as Long (1964) nonprofit hospitals were seen as maximizing quantity
subject to a quality and budget constraint.37 Such research continues with Herbst and Prüfer (2016) modeling
a nonprofit where a group of owners value quality and profit but are subject to a zero profit constraint and an
eﬃciency-wage contract with the employed manager. The manager chooses price to maximize its eﬃciency
37Alternatively, Newhouse (1970) models a nonprofit hospital as maximizing a function of output and quality subject to a
zero profit constraint.
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wage and a small share of profit (the rest of which is donated) minus eﬀort cost. They find a nonprofit can
be socially preferred to a for-profit firm.38
Theories of nonprofit status choice have often focused on nonprofit status overcoming market failures from
non-contractable product quality or non-contractible worker decisions. Hansmann’s (1980) canonical paper
argues that nonprofits overcome non-contractible quality. Formalized in a model by Glaeser and Schleifer
(2001), nonprofit status softens profit incentives. This assures consumers and donors that quality will not
be sacrificed for profit. The nonprofit firm owner benefits from more revenue and donations while consumers
benefit from better quality. In a similar vein, Bubb and Kaufman (2013) argue that nonprofit firms have
less incentive to take advantage of consumer when setting contract terms.
Hansmann (1981) focuses on performing arts companies that rely on both donations and ticket sales.
Philanthropic patrons that value production by more than the ticket price are willing to donate (something
he calls “voluntary price discrimination”). Being a nonprofit elicits more donations because of the tax-
exemption donors receive, and so benefits the firm.
Pauly and Redisch (1973) suggest nonprofit status incentivizes eﬃcient provision of quality when a few
workers possess an overwhelming share of the human capital needed for production. They consider physicians
working in a nonprofit hospital. Physicians possess a majority of the information needed to produce quality
hospital services. Further, the eﬃcient use of this information cannot be monitored by the hospital. They
argue the hospital may benefit from giving full control of hospital service to the physicians. In this case,
one way to incentivize physicians to act eﬃciently is for the hospital to choose nonprofit status and make
physicians the residual claimant.
Francois (2003) shows that a manager can choose nonprofit status because it elicits higher eﬀort from an
intrinsically motivated worker. Nonprofit status assures the worker that extra eﬀort increases output rather
than profit. The zero profit constraint reduces the manager’s incentive to let worker eﬀort crowd out other
costly inputs. Ghatak and Mueller (2011) adopt a similar model and show that nonprofit status weakly
(and, in some cases, strictly) reduces social welfare.
However, these models do not consider the strategic interaction of firms. Many nonprofits operate in
imperfectly competitive markets. Hospitals are no exception. In 2010, 150 of the 306 hospital referral
regions in the US were considered “highly concentrated” with a Herfindahl-Herschman Index over 2,500
(Cutler et. al 2013). Additionally, 98 regions are considered “moderately concentrated” (1,500 < HHI <
2,500).39 Prüfer (2011) models a duopoly between nonprofit firm owners who maximize quality subject to
38Alternatively, nonprofits have been modeled as maximizing the level and distribution of consumer surplus with the ability
to price discriminate across various types of consumers (Steinberg and Weisbrod 2005). They show that the nonprofit firm’s
distributional concerns aﬀect the prices they set and the amount they sell to various groups of buyers. Sometimes highly valued
consumers are given the good for free while others are excluded from the market.
39A large literature models the quality choice of hospitals in a spatial duopoly (see e.g. Montefiori 2005, Brekke et. al 2006,
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a zero profit constraint. He finds that merger to monopoly can either increase or decrease social welfare
depending on how much value the owners’ put on quality. Philipson and Posner (2009) model Cournot
competition between nonprofit firms that value both profit and own output. They show that a merger
typically reduces social welfare because of reduced output and higher prices.40 They show their results apply
in long-run competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms.
Studies of rivalry between nonprofits and for-profits in mixed markets are also motivated by the hospital
industry. Of the 4,999 private US hospitals, 2894 are nonprofit, while the remaining 2,105 are for-profit
(American Hospital Association, 2014b). A large and growing literature models Cournot duopoly between a
nonprofit firm and for-profit firm. In these models, nonprofit status is taken exogenously and does not require
a zero profit constraint. Instead, the main diﬀerence between nonprofit and for-profit firms is their objective
functions. Most have assumed that the nonprofit firm maximizes a combination of profit and consumer
surplus and the for-profit firm maximizes profit (Sansing 2000, Lien 2002, Goering 2007 2008a, Ferreira
2009).41 However, this does not acknowledge the assumption common in the CSR literature that for-profit
firms can also value consumer surplus. I assume that both firms value consumer surplus. In contrast to
these models, I follow the literature on nonprofit status choice by taking nonprofit status to be endogenous
and assuming that nonprofit status involves a zero profit constraint.
In summary there are two broad tracks of research on nonprofits: those that consider endogenous nonprofit
status choice and those that model nonprofits in imperfectly competitive markets. This paper models
two firms that value consumer surplus and allows them both to choose nonprofit status. I show that
an endogenous mixed market can emerge despite identical objectives firms and in the absence of a tax-
exemption. This abandons the assumption common in the literature on mixed markets that only nonprofits
value consumer surplus and for-profits value profit. It demonstrates for the first time that the interaction of
two firms that value consumer surplus can, on its own, generate an incentive for one firm to choose nonprofit
status.
3.3 Model and Solution
In this section, I model duopoly where firms value both profit and consumer surplus. I consider firms’ choice
of nonprofit status, where nonprofit status involves the limit of zero profit. Two firms produce total output
Q = qi + qj (58)
Gravelle and Sivey 2010, Andree and Schwan 2014).
40They extend the analysis to show that merger can increase welfare in some cases when firms value total output or consumer
surplus rather than own output.
41A few others have assumed a nonprofit objective that includes own output instead of consumer surplus (Skak 2006, 2011,
Unfried 2012).
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and serve a market with the linear inverse demand function
P = a Q (59)
where P is the market price and a is the reservation price. Firms have increasing marginal costs with identical
slope k, so profit is
⇡i = Pqi   1
2
kq2i . (60)
Both firms maximize a weighted average of their own profit and consumer surplus (CS), where CS = 12Q
2
given the linear demand. Nonprofit status involves a nondistribution constraint : profits cannot be distributed
to the owner. Any profit must remain within the firm and thus is not enjoyed by the owner. Utility is given
by
u1 (di, dj) = (1  ↵)⇡i + ↵
2
Q2 (61)
u0 (di, dj) = (1  ↵)⇡i + ↵
2
Q2 subject to ⇡i  0 (62)
where superscript 1 denotes for-profit status and 0 denotes nonprofit status. Each firm’s utility is a function
both firms’ status, where
di =
8>><>>:
0, if firm i chooses nonprofit status
1, if firm i chooses for-profit status
and 0 < ↵  1 is identical across firms. The weight on profit is taken as exogenous and the cost structure
remains the same even if a firm changes status.
The game is played in two stages. In stage 1, each firm chooses between nonprofit and for-profit status.
In stage 2, firms engage in Cournot competition by simultaneously choosing output to maximize utility, given
their nonprofit or for-profit status. The game is solved using backward induction.
3.3.1 Stage 2: Production Choice
In stage 2, firms simultaneously choose output to maximize their own utility. Finding equilibrium production
levels requires simultaneously solving the firms’ best response functions. There are three possible status
combinations: two for-profits, a mixed market, and two nonprofits. Each of these is considered in turn.
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Two For-profits The best-response function of a for-profit is found by setting the derivative of (61) with
respect to qi equal to zero and solving for qi yielding
qBR,1i =
a  qj
⇣
1  ↵1 ↵
⌘
k + 2  ↵1 ↵
. (63)
This best-response function collapses to the profit-maximizing best-response function of a qjk+2 when ↵ = 0.
42
A for-profit firm’s output is a strategic compliment to its rival’s if and only if (iﬀ) ↵ > 12 . Diﬀerentiating
(63) with respect to qj yields
@qBR1i
@qj
=  
⇣
1  ↵1 ↵
k+2  ↵1 ↵
⌘
which is positive when ↵ > 12 .
Simultaneously solving the best-response functions for the two firms yields equilibrium output, which can
be returned to (58), (59), (60) and (61) yielding equilibrium total output, price, profit and utility:
q1(1, 1) =
a
k + 3  2↵1 ↵
(64)
Q⇤(1, 1) =
2a
k + 3  2↵1 ↵
(65)
P ⇤(1, 1) =
a
⇣
k + 1  2 ↵1 ↵
⌘
k + 3  2↵1 ↵
(66)
⇡1(1, 1) =
a2(k + 2  4↵1 ↵ )
2(k + 3  2↵1 ↵ )2
(67)
u1(1, 1) = (1  ↵)
"
a2(k + 2)
2(k + 3  2↵1 ↵ )2
#
(68)
where (1, 1) reflects the for-profit status of both firms. Positive output requires ↵ < k+2k+3 .
As the weight on consumer surplus ↵ increases, output and utility increase and price decreases. Equilib-
rium profit first increases and then decreases in ↵. Profit can be negative if the firms’ weight on consumer
surplus is large enough. Assuming firms do not have access to outside funding restricts attention to the cases
of non-negative profit, ↵  k+2k+6 (equation (67) shows that ⇡   0 () ↵  k+2k+6 ).
A Mixed Market In a mixed market, one firm has nonprofit status and the other has for-profit status.
The for-profit’s best-response function remains (63), while the nonprofit firm sets its output qj such that its
profit (60) is zero.43 Solving for qj yields firm j’s best-response function
qBR,0j =
2 (a  qi)
k + 2
. (69)
42The second order condition holds as long as ↵ < k+2k+3 .
43Alternatively, the firm owner could, but never would, produce at a level that earns positive profit and retain the profit
within the firm.
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The nonprofit’s best-response function diﬀers dramatically from that of a for-profit firm. Unlike the for-profit
firm, it does not depend on the firm’s weight on consumer surplus. The nondistribution constraint requires
profit to remain at zero regardless of firms’ preferences. A nonprofit firm’s output is always a strategic
substitute to its rival’s. Diﬀerentiating (69) with respect to qi yields  
⇣
2
k+2
⌘
which is negative for all k > 0.
Solving (69) and (63) simultaneously for qi and qj yield equilibrium output, which can be returned to
(58), (59), (60), (61) and (62) yielding equilibrium total output, price, profit and utility:
q0(0, 1) =
2a(k + 1  ↵1 ↵ )
k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵
(70)
q1(0, 1) =
a(k + 2↵1 ↵ )
k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵
(71)
Q⇤(0, 1) =
a(3k + 2)
k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵
(72)
P ⇤(0, 1) =
ak(k + 1  ↵1 ↵ )
k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵
(73)
⇡0(0, 1) = 0 (74)
⇡1(0, 1) =
a2k
⇣
k + 2↵1 ↵
⌘
(k + 2  4↵1 ↵ )
2(k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵ )2
(75)
u0(0, 1) =
"
a2↵(3k + 2)2
2(k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵ )2
#
(76)
u1(0, 1) = (1  ↵)
8>><>>:
a2k
⇣
k + 2↵1 ↵
⌘
(k + 2  4↵1 ↵ ) + ↵1 ↵k
⇣
k + 1  ↵1 ↵
⌘2 
2
⇣
k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵
⌘2
9>>=>>; . (77)
The nonprofit firm produces more than the for-profit firm and the for-profit always earns higher profit than
the nonprofit. Since the firms have identical weights on consumer surplus, their only utility diﬀerence is
profit. Thus, utility of the for-profit always exceeds that of the nonprofit, given that a mixed market has
arisen. Total output in the mixed market is always greater than total output in the for-profit market.
Two Nonprofits If both firms choose nonprofit status they both have best-response function (69). Solving
these simultaneously yields equilibrium output which can be returned to (58), (59), (60) and (62) yielding
equilibrium total output, price, profit and utility:
63
q0(0, 0) =
2a
k + 4
. (78)
Q⇤(0, 0) =
4a
k + 4
(79)
P ⇤(0, 0) =
ak
k + 4
(80)
⇡0(0, 0) = 0 (81)
u0(0, 0) = ↵
✓
4a
k + 4
◆2
. (82)
Since the firms’ weight on consumer surplus, ↵, is absent from both best-response functions, it does not
aﬀect any market outcomes other than utility levels. Total output in the nonprofit market is always greater
than total output in the mixed market and the for-profit market.
3.3.2 Stage 1: Status Choice
In stage 1, the firms simultaneously choose whether to take on nonprofit or for-profit status. In making this
choice the firm must consider the status of the rival. For status choices to be an equilibrium, neither firm
can have incentive to switch status, given the status of the rival. Equilibrium status choices are summarized
in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10: A mixed market arises endogenously when ↵⇤ < ↵ < k+2k+6 , where
↵⇤ =
2k4 + 23k3 + 72k2 + 65k + 18  (k + 1)p13k4 + 86k3 + 181k2 + 140k + 36
2k4 + 30k3 + 122k2 + 122k + 36
.
Both firms choose for-profit status otherwise, when 0 < ↵ < ↵⇤.
Proof : See Appendix.
When the firms’ weight on consumer surplus is relatively large (↵ > ↵⇤), one firm chooses nonprofit status
while the other chooses for-profit status. Figure 4 plots the critical ↵⇤ and k+2k+6 in (k,↵)-space. As k and
↵ increase, the mixed market range increases in size. For low levels of ↵ (below ↵⇤), both firms choose
for-profit status.
[ Figure 4 about here ]
For intuition behind Proposition 10, return to the firms’ best-response functions (63) and (69). Recall
that a for-profit firm’s output is a strategic compliment to its rival’s only if ↵ > 12 . In this case, when a
firm chooses nonprofit status and increases its output to accommodate the nondistribution constraint, the
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for-profit rival responds by also increasing its output. For the firm that has just chosen nonprofit status,
this response directly increases its utility through greater consumer surplus. This reward mitigates the lost
profit from choosing nonprofit status. When the gain in utility from the for-profit rival’s response outweighs
the lost utility from lower profit, there is incentive to choose nonprofit status.
Conversely, a nonprofit firm’s output is a strategic substitute to its rival’s. Thus, if the second firm chooses
nonprofit status and increases its output to accommodate the nondistribution constraint, the nonprofit rival
responds by reducing its output. This response directly lowers the utility of the second nonprofit firm as
it reduces consumer surplus. There is no reward to mitigate the lost profit from nonprofit status when the
rival is also nonprofit.
3.4 Social Welfare
In this section, I consider the eﬀect of endogenous status choice on social welfare. I assume that the
government’s social welfare function is a weighted average of total firms’ profit and consumer surplus:
W = (1   ) (⇡i + ⇡j) +  
2
Q2. (83)
I focus on cases where the government values consumer surplus at least as much as producer surplus, or
    12 .44 This function has a form similar to the firms’ utility functions in that it is the weighted average
of consumer surplus and profit. While the second term is identical to the firms’, the first term includes
the profit of both firms rather than just one. Under a mixed market, a nonprofit and a for-profit market,
respectively, (83) becomes
W (0, 1) = (1   )
0@a2k
⇣
k + 2↵1 ↵
⌘
(k + 2  4↵1 ↵ )
2(k2 + 4k + 2  ↵1 ↵ )2
1A+  
2
 
a(3k + 2)
k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵
!2
(84)
W (0, 0) =
8a2 
k2 + 8k + 16
(85)
W (1, 1) = (1   )
 
2a2(k + 2  4↵1 ↵ )
2(k + 3  2↵1 ↵ )2
!
+
 
2
 
2a
k + 3  2↵1 ↵
!2
(86)
Under all three market types a2 can be factored out leaving functions of ↵ and k only. Thus a change
in the reservation price a never aﬀects the rankings of the three market types. Proposition 11 ranks social
welfare in the three market types for various weights  .
44When   = 12 , the function collapses to W =
1
2
 
⇡i + ⇡j +
1
2Q
2
 
. This function is a monotonic transformation of the
common W = ⇡i+⇡j + 12Q
2 which has been used to analyze welfare even when firms do not maximize profit (Hansmann 1981,
Kato and Tomaru 2007).
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Proposition 11: A mixed market is never the first-best market type for any 0     1. For   <  ⇤
the for-profit market is the socially optimal market type, for      ⇤ the nonprofit market is the
socially optimal one, where
 ⇤ =
(1  ↵) k2 + 8 (1  ↵) k + 16 (1  ↵)
(1  ↵) k2 + 14 (1  ↵) k + 36  44↵ .
Proof: See Appendix.
When the government’s weight on consumer surplus is relatively high (     ⇤), the nonprofit market is
socially superior to both the for-profit and the mixed market. The consumer surplus gained from two
nonprofit firms outweighs the lost profits. The tradeoﬀ of consumer surplus for profit is always greater with
two nonprofits than with one. When the government’s weight is relatively low (  <  ⇤), the for-profit market
is socially superior to both the nonprofit and the mixed market. The profits gained from two for-profits firms
outweighs the lost consumer surplus. This tradeoﬀ of profit for consumer surplus is always greater with two
for-profits than with one. Thus, welfare in the mixed market never ranks first.
For example, consider the common case of equal weights in the social welfare function,   = 12 . When k = 2
and ↵ = 12 , the for-profit market is socially optimal since   is less than the critical  
⇤ = 610 . Alternatively, if
k = 1 and ↵ = 110 , the nonprofit market is socially optimal since   is greater than the critical  
⇤ = 0.499.45
In general, the critical  ⇤ increases in k and ↵ (@ 
⇤
@↵ ,
@ ⇤
@k > 0) and  
⇤ is greater than ↵, for all k.46
Additionally, 0   ⇤  1 for all 0 < ↵ < 1 and k > 0. Thus there is always a   for which the nonprofit
market is first-best, and there is always a   for which the for-profit market is first-best. Meanwhile, the
mixed market is never the first-best market type.
3.5 Nonprofit Tax-Exemption
Until now, the focus has been on nonprofit status choice independent of a subsidy or tax-exemption. However,
grants and other subsidies are often conditional on nonprofit status. In the U.S., 501(c)(3) nonprofit status
involves exemption of property, sales and corporate income taxes. Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998, 2006)
show that this nonprofit subsidy can generate a nonprofit status choice for firms that value output as well
as profit. Hansmann (1987) uses state-level industry and tax-exemption data to show that larger nonprofit
tax-exemptions correlate with a larger share of nonprofits relative to for-profit firms. This section explores
the consequence of a nonprofit tax-exemption on firms’ nonprofit status choice in duopoly.
I focus on the exemption of a lump-sum tax. Assume that for-profit firms are subject to a lump-sum tax
45Setting  ⇤ = 12 and solving for ↵ yields ↵ =
k2+2k 4
k2+2k 12 . Values of ↵ below (above) this level yield  
⇤ below (above) 12 .
46To see this,  ⇤ > 0 when ↵ = 0, and @ 
⇤
@↵ > 1, for all k.
66
F , while the nonprofits are exempt from the tax. Thus, utility is now
u1 (di, dj) = (1  ↵) (⇡i   F ) + ↵
2
Q2 (87)
u0 (di, dj) = (1  ↵)⇡i + ↵
2
Q2 subject to ⇡i  0. (88)
The only diﬀerence from (61) and (62) is that a fixed cost enters the for-profit utility function (87) weighted
by (1 ↵). Since a fixed cost does not aﬀect the firms’ output choices, a for-profit firm’s best-response function
remains (63). A nonprofit firm’s best-response function is also unchanged since utility is unchanged.
Equilibrium output and prices in the three possible market structures (for-profit, mixed and nonprofit)
are, thus, the same as without the nonprofit tax-exemption. Equilibrium utility for a nonprofit is unaﬀected
by F , while utility for the for-profit is reduced by (1  ↵)F :
u1(1, 1) = (1  ↵)
"
a2(k + 2)
2(k + 3  2↵1 ↵ )2
  F
#
(89)
u0(0, 1) =
"
a2↵(3k + 2)2
2(k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵ )2
#
(90)
u1(0, 1) = (1  ↵)
8><>:
a2k
h⇣
k + 2↵1 ↵
⌘
(k + 2  4↵1 ↵ )
i
2
⇣
k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵
⌘2 + (91)
+
a2k

↵
1 ↵k
⇣
k + 1  ↵1 ↵
⌘2 
2
⇣
k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵
⌘2   F
9>>=>>;
u0(0, 0) = ↵
✓
4a
k + 4
◆2
. (92)
Nonprofit status choices are aﬀected by the tax-exemption since F aﬀects for-profit utility but not nonprofit
utility. Proposition 12 describes the parameter range generating the endogenous mixed market under a
nonprofit tax-exemption.
Proposition 12: An endogenous mixed market occurs if F  F  F , where
F =
8>><>>:
0 if ↵⇤ < ↵ < k+2k+6
Ca2
D if 0 < ↵ < ↵
⇤
F =
Ea2
F
and C, D, E and F are functions of ↵ and k found in the Appendix.
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Proof: As proven in Proposition 1, when F = 0 a firm prefers to choose nonprofit status when
↵⇤  ↵  k+2k+6 . Equating (89) and (90) and solving for F yields F . When F > F , a firm with
a for-profit rival prefers nonprofit status to for-profit status. Equating (91) and (92) and solving
for F yields F . When F < F , a firm with a nonprofit rival prefers for-profit status to nonprofit
status.
When the nonprofit tax-exemption is small (F < F,F ) both firms choose for-profit status. As F increases
beyond F and remains below F , the mixed market becomes the endogenous choice. Alternatively, in cases
where F is greater than F but remains less than F , it becomes a coordination game where both the nonprofit
market and the for-profit market are SGPNE. When the tax-exemption is large (F > F,F ) both firms choose
nonprofit status. The k and ↵ parameter range that can generate the endogenous mixed market under a
nonprofit tax-exemption is summarized in the following result.
Result 1: A nonprofit tax-exemption expands the parameter range of k and ↵ generating an
endogenous mixed market. Identifying this range requires identifying where F   F > 0. While
the equality F   F = 0 cannot be solved for ↵ explicitly, the roots of F   F can be found for
any k. Figure 5 plots and connects these roots revealing that they are less than ↵⇤. For ↵ values
above these roots (the shaded area in Figure 5) F   F > 0. Thus the parameter range capable
of generating an endogenous mixed market is expanded under a tax-exemption.
[ Figure 5 about here ]
Admittedly, there still exist many cases where the endogenous mixed market cannot occur. Contrasting
Figure 5 with Figure 4 demonstrates the diﬀerence in parameter ranges with and without a nonprofit tax-
exemption. For example suppose k = 3. Without a tax-exemption, a mixed market emerges for 0.55 <
↵ < 0.56. With a tax-exemption F  F  F a mixed market emerges for the much larger range of
0.47 < ↵ < 0.56. Additionally, with the exemption, the endogenous mixed market now includes cases where
k < 2 and ↵ < 12 . The firms no longer need to value consumer surplus more than profit for a mixed market
to emerge.
[ Table 11 about here ]
Table 11 presents the critical F and F for various k and ↵. For a given k, F and F increase (weakly) as
↵ decreases. For example, suppose that k = 3. When ↵ = 0.555, F = F = 0. The mixed market emerges
endogenously without any tax-exemption, but with any positive F both firms choose nonprofit status. As ↵
decreases to 0.545, F = 0 and F = 0.0013a2. The mixed market can still emerge without a tax-exemption.
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However, the mixed market can also emerge with positive tax-exemptions. As ↵ decreases to 0.473, both F
and F increase to F = F = 0.0097a2.
3.6 Social Welfare: Endogenous Nonprofit Tax-Exemption
In this section, I investigate social welfare under an endogenous nonprofit tax-exemption. I focus on the
cases where the optimal choice of F generates a mixed market.47 The game now proceeds in three stages.
In stage 1, the government chooses F , the lump-sum tax taken from each for-profit firm but not from a
nonprofit firm. Stages 2 and 3 proceed as before with nonprofit status choice in stage 2 and then quantity
choices in stage 3, taking F as given.
Stage 3 outputs and the resulting prices are the same as without a nonprofit tax-exemption since a fixed
cost does not aﬀect production choices. These equilibrium values are presented in Section 3. Utility for a
for-profit firm is reduced by F (1   ↵) while utility for a nonprofit firm is unaﬀected by F , as presented in
equations (89), (90), (91), (92).
Stage 2 status choices as a function of F are summarized in Proposition 3. The endogenous mixed market
is generated for a range of F (between F and F ). Alternatively, low levels of F (less than or equal to F )
generate a for-profit market and high levels (greater than F ) generate a nonprofit market.
In stage 1, the government chooses F to maximize social welfare. I assume that when the government
collects F from each for-profit firm the tax revenue is valued as if it were distributed directly to consumers:48
W = (1   ) (⇡i + ⇡j   F (di + dj)) +  
✓
Q2
2
+ F (di + dj)
◆
(93)
where di is zero when firm i is nonprofit and is unity when firm i is for-profit. The government’s optimal
choice of F is summarized in Proposition 13.
Proposition 13: The government chooses F ⇤ = F and the mixed market arises, when  ⇤1 <   <
 ⇤2 , where
 ⇤1 =
4↵2k   ↵(1  ↵)  7k2 + 30k + 16 
(k3   16) (1  ↵)2 + (13↵2   14↵+ 1)k2 + (34↵2   12↵  14)k
 ⇤2 =
G
H
and G and H are functions of ↵ and k found in the Appendix.
47This is both the interesting case and it simplifies analysis. In the other case, the government’s choice of F can generate
three possible outcomes: a nonprofit market, a for-profit market, or a coordination game where both the nonprofit market and
the for-profit market are equilibria.
48This reflects the government’s potential ability to redistribute tax revenue to the benefit of consumers.
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Proof: Since     12 , the government chooses F in the for-profit market, F in the mixed market
and F (weakly) in the nonprofit market. Returning these to their respective welfare functions
yield
W (1, 1) = (1   )
 
2a2(k + 2  4↵1 ↵ )
2(k + 3  2↵1 ↵ )2
!
+  
241
2
 
2a
k + 3  2↵1 ↵
!235+ (94)
+2F (2    1)
W (0, 1) = (1   )
0@a2k
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⌘
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1A+  
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a(3k + 2)
k2 + 4k + 2  k ↵1 ↵
!235+
+F (2    1) (95)
W (0, 0) =
8a2 
k2 + 8k + 16
. (96)
Setting (94) equal to (95) and solving for   yields  ⇤2 . When   <  ⇤2 , W
 
0, 1 | F   > W  0, 0 | F  .
Similarly, setting (94) equal to (96) and solving for   yields  ⇤1 . When   >  ⇤1 , W
 
0, 1 | F   >
W (1, 1 | F ). The result follows.
Since the government values consumer surplus over producer surplus, tax revenue benefits society and the
government chooses the largest F that generates a given market type. From stage 2, the largest F that
generates a for-profit market is F and the largest level that generates a nonprofit market is F . If the
government wants to generate a nonprofit market it must set F above F and the level does not directly
aﬀect welfare (since there are no for-profit firms).
Proposition 13 demonstrates that with a tax-exemption the mixed market can become the socially optimal
market type. The intuition can be found in the social welfare functions (94), (95) and (96). In the for-profit
market, tax revenue F is collected from the for-profit firms for a total tax revenue of 2F . In the mixed
market, the total tax revenue F is collected from the one for-profit firm. In the nonprofit market, no taxes
are collected.
Thus, total tax revenue in the mixed market can be greater than both of the other markets. This occurs
when 0  2F < F . In this case, welfare in the mixed market can go from ranking third (without the
nonprofit tax-exemption) to first (with the tax-exemption). For example suppose k = 3, ↵ = 0.545 and
  = 0.633. Without the tax-exemption, the mixed market welfare ranks third.49 With the endogenous
nonprofit tax-exemption, each firm in a for-profit market is taxed F = 0, while the for-profit firm in a mixed
market is taxed F = 0.0013a2. The tax revenue collected in the mixed market sends its welfare above the
welfare of both of the other two markets types.50
49Returning ↵ and k to  1 and  2 in the proof for Proposition 2, the mixed market ranks third when 0.631 <   < 0.634.
50Returning ↵ and k to  ⇤1 and  ⇤2 in Proposition 4, the mixed market ranks first when 0.62 <   < 0.71.
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Alternatively, total tax revenue in the mixed market can be less than in for-profit market but greater than
in the nonprofit market. This occurs when 0 < F < 2F . In this case, welfare in the mixed market can go from
ranking second behind the nonprofit market (without a tax-exemption) to first (with the tax-exemption).
For example, suppose k = 3 and ↵ = 12 and   = 0.65. Without the tax-exemption, the mixed market welfare
ranks second to the nonprofit market.51 With the endogenous nonprofit tax-exemption, each firm in the
for-profit market is taxed F = 0.005a2, for a total tax revenue of 2F = 0.010a2, while the for-profit firm in
the mixed market is taxed F = 0.0067a2. The tax revenue collected in the mixed market sends its welfare
above the welfare in the nonprofit market and it also remains socially superior to the for-profit market.
The parameter range of k and ↵ where the endogenous mixed market can be the socially optimal market
type is summarized in the following result.
Result 2 : When the endogenous mixed market is possible for some F , it is almost always optimal
for some  , as shown in Figure 2. Identifying this range requires finding where  ⇤2   ⇤1 > 0 (since
Proposition 4 requires that  ⇤1 <  ⇤2). While the equality  ⇤2    ⇤1 = 0 cannot be solved for ↵
explicitly, the roots of  ⇤2    ⇤1 can be found for various k. Figure 2 plots and connects these
roots, separating the lightly shaded and the darkly shaded areas. In the darkly shaded area the
mixed market is both possible and is potentially optimal. In the much smaller lightly shaded
area the mixed market is possible but is never optimal.
Table 12 gives  ⇤1 and  ⇤2 for various values of k and ↵ combinations. For example, when k = 3 and ↵ = 0.545,
the mixed market is optimal if 0.62 <   < 0.71.
[ Table 12 about here ]
For   <  ⇤1 the for-profit market is the optimal market type and for   >  ⇤2 the nonprofit market is the
optimal market type. For larger k (given ↵),  ⇤1 and  ⇤2 increase. For all but one of these k and ↵ combinations
 ⇤1 > ↵. Admittedly, the critical range of   can be small. Nonetheless, the result that a mixed market can
be the socially optimal market type for some values of   provides a possible explanation for the presence of
mixed markets under a nonprofit tax-exemption policy.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides the first examination of nonprofit status choice in a Cournot duopoly. It demonstrates
that a mixed market can emerge endogenously even when firms have identical costs and objective functions.
51Returning ↵ and k to  2 in the proof for Proposition 2, the mixed market ranks second to the nonprofit market when
0.625 <  .
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When firms value both profit and consumer surplus, they can treat output as strategic compliments. Thus,
when a firm chooses nonprofit status and increases output to accommodate the zero profit condition, it is
rewarded by the additional output of its for-profit rival. For its part, the for-profit firm has no incentive
to become a second nonprofit. If it were to increase output to satisfy the zero profit constraint, the first
nonprofit would reduce output to continue accommodating its own constraint. Thus, the incentive to choose
nonprofit status exists for one firm while being absent for the other. In this way, an endogenously chosen
mixed market emerges even among firms with identical weights on consumer surplus.
Yet, without a tax-exemption, the endogenous mixed market is shown to never be the socially superior
market type. The government prefers either the nonprofit market or the for-profit market, as determined
by the weight on consumer surplus in its social welfare function. For weights on consumer surplus above
(below) a threshold, the nonprofit (for-profit) market is the socially superior one.
With a tax-exemption, the endogenous mixed market can be the socially superior market type and is
generated by a larger parameter range. When the government’s weight on consumer surplus is within a
critical range, its optimal choice of a nonprofit tax-exemption generates the mixed market. Tax revenue can
sometimes be larger in the mixed market than in the other market types. This additional tax revenue can
improves welfare if it is potentially passed to consumers. Thus, welfare in the mixed market can go from
ranking second or third without the tax-exemption, to first with the tax-exemption.
These results provide an explanation for the presence of mixed market under a nonprofit tax-exemption
policy. Additionally, they take a logical next step in the literature on mixed market. Models of mixed
markets in Cournot duopoly have taken nonprofit status choice to be exogenous. Research on nonprofit
status choice has largely ignored imperfect competition. I incorporate both features, nonprofit status choice
and Cournot duopoly, into a single model for the first time.
Mixed markets are common in important industries such as healthcare, education and the arts. However,
economists have not provided very many strong explanations for why or how such markets arise. The fact
that nonprofits tend to compete in industries involving a public good suggests all firms are likely to value
objectives other than only profit. This paper demonstrates that when two firms, identical in their value
of consumer surplus, compete in an imperfectly competitive market, a mixed can arise and be the socially
optimal market type.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium status choices
A mixed market is chosen endogenously for certain values of k (the slope of the marginal cost curves) and
↵ (the weight on consumer surplus in the firms’ utility functions) as shown by the shaded area. For other
values of k and ↵, a for-profit market arises endogenously. Irrelevant cases (because of negative profits) are
denoted by “n/a.”
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Figure 5: Status Choice and Social Optimality with Nonprofit Tax-Exemption
A nonprofit tax-exemption 0 < F < F < F expands the parameter range where a mixed market is chosen
endogenously, as shown by the shaded areas. The unshaded area “n/a” denotes irrelevant cases where profits
are negative. The other unshaded area denotes cases where the mixed market cannot occur for any F .
When the government’s welfare function has a weight on consumer surplus, In the darkly shaded area, if
 ⇤1 <   <  ⇤2 the socially optimal tax-exemption is F ⇤ = F and the mixed market is generated. Conversely,
in the smaller lightly shaded area, the mixed market is possible but is never optimal.
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Table 10: Nash equilibria in status choices when ↵⇤ < ↵ < k+2k+6
Firm j
Nonprofit (dj = 0) For-profit (dj = 1)
Firm i
Nonprofit u0i (0, 0) u0i (0, 1)
(di = 0) u0j (0, 0) u
1
j (0, 1)
For-profit u1i (0, 1) u1i (1, 1)
(di = 1) u0j (0, 1) u
1
j (1, 1)
When firm j is nonprofit, firm i prefers for-profit to nonprofit status, denoted by underlined u1i (0, 1) in the
bottom left cell (and, by symmetry, u1j (0, 1) in the upper right cell). When firm j is for-profit, firm i
prefers nonprofit to for-profit since ↵⇤ < ↵ < k+2k+6 , denoted by underlined u
0
i (0, 1) in the top right cell (and,
by symmetry, u0j (0, 1) in the bottom left cell). There are two simultaneous best-responses, each with one
firm choosing nonprofit status and the other choosing for-profit status.
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Table 11: Critical F and F (scaled by 100a2 ) for an endogenous mixed market
↵ k = 0.5 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 5 k = 10
0.750 (0, 0)
0.717 (0, 0.22)
0.700 Irrelevant (negative profits) (0.16, 0.35)
0.650 (0.72, 0.72)
0.627 (0, 0)
0.614 (0, 0.22)
0.556 (0, 0) (0.70, 0.80)
0.545 (0, 0.13) (0.85, 0.89)
0.539 (0.03, 0.21) (0.94, 0.94)
0.500 (0, 0) (0.5, 0.67)
0.473 (0.19, 0.38) (0.97, 0.97)
0.433 (0.89, 0.89)
0.429 (0, 0)
0.400 (0.32, 0.41) A mixed market cannot emerge for any F
0.385 (0, 0) (0.60, 0.60)
0.375 (0.08, 0.12)
0.359 (0.31, 0.31)
When F < F < F the mixed market arises endogenously. When F is greater (less) than both critical values
both firms choose nonprofit (for-profit) status.
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Table 12: Critical  ⇤1 and  ⇤2 for a socially optimal mixed market
↵ k = 0.5 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 5 k = 10
0.750 (0.68, 0.86)
0.717 (0.73, 0.89)
0.700 (0.76, 0.91)
0.650 Irrelevant (negative profits) (0.89, 1.00)
0.627 (0.65, 0.78)
0.614 (0.66, 0.78)
0.556 (0.61, 0.71) (0.71, 0.79)
0.545 (0.62, 0.71) (0.73, 0.80)
0.539 (0.62, 0.71) (0.74, 0.80)
0.500 (0.59, 0.67) (0.64, 0.69)
0.473 (0.59, 0.65) (0.66, 0.69)
0.433 (0.61, 0.62)
0.429 (0.55, 0.60)
0.400 (0.55, 0.57)
0.39 (0.55, 0.55)
0.385 (0.53, 0.56) A mixed market cannot emerge for any F
0.375 (0.53, 0.54)
0.366 (0.53, 0.53)
0.359
When  ⇤1 <   <  ⇤2 , the government chooses F ⇤ = F . The mixed market arises as the socially optimal
market type. When   >  ⇤2 , the nonprofit market is the socially optimal market type, which the
government can generate with any F   F . When   <  ⇤1 , the government chooses F ⇤ = F , and the
for-profit market is the socially optimal market type.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Endogenous mixed market requires that status combination (di = 0, dj = 1) or (di = 1, dj = 0) is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SGPNE). A SGPNE in status means that both firms’ status choices are
simultaneous best-responses to each other. Finding a best-response requires comparing a firms utility levels
under the two status options, holding the rival’s status constant.
First, if firm j is for-profit, then firm i earns utility (76) under nonprofit status and (68) under for-profit
status. Equating these two values and solving for ↵ yields four roots. However, the only relevant roots are
k+2
k+6 and
↵⇤ =
2k4 + 23k3 + 72k2 + 65k + 18  (k + 1)p13k4 + 86k3 + 181k2 + 140k + 36
2k4 + 30k3 + 122k2 + 122k + 36
.
Plugging in various values of ↵ and k reveals that
u0i (0, 1) > u
1
i (0, 0) if ↵
⇤ < ↵ <
k + 2
k + 6
u0i (0, 1)  u1i (0, 0) if 0 < ↵ < ↵⇤.
Thus, firm i’s best-response to dj = 1 is di = 0 when ↵⇤ < ↵ < k+2k+6 . Otherwise, its best-response is di = 1
when 0 < ↵ < ↵⇤.
Second, if firm j is nonprofit, firm i earns utility (82) under nonprofit status and (77) with for-profit
status. Equating these two values and solving for ↵ yields three roots. However, the only relevant root is
k+2
k+6 where
u0i (0, 0) < u
1
i (0, 1) if 0 < ↵ <
k + 2
k + 6
.
Thus, firm i’s best-response to dj = 0 is di = 1. Since firms i and j are identical, the above inequalities
apply to both firms’ status choices.
Table 10 illustrates these incentives in a bi-matrix for the case when ↵⇤ < ↵ < k+2k+6 . The mixed market
is a SGP Nash equilibrium since one for-profit and one nonprofit involves simultaneous best-responses in
nonprofit status. Two symmetric equilibria exist, each with one of the two firms choosing each status.
Alternatively, if 0 < ↵ < ↵⇤ for-profit status is a dominant strategy (a best-response regardless of the
rival’s status). In this case, the SGP Nash equilibrium has both firms choosing for-profit status. This
bi-matrix can be constructed following a similar process as for Table 10. The result in Proposition 1 follows.
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3.8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Equating (84) and (85) and solving for   yields  1. Similarly using (85) and (86) yields  ⇤, and using (84)
and (86) yields  2 where
 1 =
(1  ↵) k3 + (8  6↵) k2 + 16k + 32↵
(1  ↵) k3 + (15  13↵) k2 + (46  34↵) k + 16 + 16↵
 ⇤ =
(1  ↵) k2 + 8 (1  ↵) k + 16 (1  ↵)
(1  ↵) k2 + 14 (1  ↵) k + 36  44↵
 2 =
A
B
0 <  1 <  
⇤ <  2 < 1
and
A =
 
↵3   3↵2 + 3↵  1  k4 +  12↵3   34↵2 + 32↵  10  k3 +
+
 
53↵3   131↵2 + 109↵  31  k2 +  90↵3   172↵2 + 122↵  33  k +
+8↵3   24↵2 + 24↵  8
B =
 
↵3   3↵2 + 3↵  1  k4 +  17↵3   49↵2 + 47↵  15  k3 +
+
 
85↵3   219↵2 + 189↵  55  k2 +  131↵3   283↵2 + 221↵  61  k +
+22↵3   62↵2 + 58↵  18.
Values of   between these critical values generate the following welfare inequalities:
W (0, 0) Q W (0, 1) iﬀ   Q  1
W (0, 0) Q W (1, 1) iﬀ   Q  ⇤
W (0, 1) Q W (1, 1) iﬀ   Q  2
Combining the three welfare inequalities yields the following social welfare rankings:
(a). For-profit > Mixed > Nonprofit if 0    <  1
(b). For-profit > Nonprofit   Mixed if  1    <  ⇤
(c). Nonprofit   For-profit > Mixed if  ⇤    <  2
(d). Nonprofit > Mixed   For-profit if  2     1.
Thus, the mixed market is never the socially optimal market type for any 0     1.
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3.8.3 Critical Nonprofit Tax-exemption Levels
F =
8>><>>:
0 if ↵⇤ < ↵ < k+2k+6
Ca2
D if 0 < ↵ < ↵
⇤
F =
Ea2
F
where
C = (↵4   4↵3 + 6↵2   4↵+ 1)k5 + (21↵4   73↵3 + 93↵2   51↵+ 10)k4 +
+(151↵4   452↵3 + 487↵2   222↵+ 36)k3 + (427↵4   1107↵3 + 1025↵2   401↵+ 56)k2 +
+(384↵4   932↵3 + 796↵2   284↵+ 36)k + 108↵4   252↵3 + 204↵2   68↵+ 8
D = (2↵4   8↵3 + 12↵2   8↵+ 2)k6 + (40↵4   148↵3 + 204↵2   124↵+ 28)k5 +
+(308↵4   1052↵3 + 1334↵2   744↵+ 154)k4 + (1120↵4   3540↵3 +
+4160↵2   2156↵+ 416)k3 ++(1858↵4   5532↵3 + 6162↵2   3040↵+ 560)k2 +
+(1080↵4   3288↵3 + 3704↵2   1832↵+ 336)k ++200↵4   640↵3 + 752↵2   384↵+ 72
E = (↵3   3↵2 + 3↵  1)k5 + (19↵3   48↵2 + 39↵  10)k4 + (112↵3   232↵2 + 152↵  32)k3 +
+(188↵3   312↵2 + 172↵  32)k2 + ( 96↵3 + 128↵2   32↵)k
F = (2↵3   6↵2 + 6↵  2)k6 + (36↵3   104↵2 + 100↵  32)k5 + (250↵3   698↵2 +
+648↵  200)k4 + (824↵3   2240↵2 + 2024↵  608)k3 ++(1256↵3   3384↵2 +
+3032↵  904)k2 + (704↵3   1984↵2 + 1856↵  576)k + 128↵3   384↵2 + 384↵  128.
3.8.4 Critical Weights in the Welfare Function
 ⇤1 =
(7↵2   7↵)k2 + (34↵2   30↵)k + 16↵2   16↵
(↵2   2↵+ 1)k3 + (13↵2   14↵+ 1)k2 + (34↵2   12↵  14)k   16↵2 + 32↵  16
 ⇤2 =
G
H
84
and
G = (3↵4   9↵3 + 9↵2   3↵)k5 + (40↵4   136↵3 + 152↵2   56↵)k4 +
+(223↵4   833↵3 + 953↵2   343↵)k3 + (698↵4   2482↵3 + 2654↵2   886↵)k2 +
+(1136↵4   3280↵3 + 3088↵2   944↵)k + 448↵4   1216↵3 + 1088↵2   320↵
H = (↵4   4↵3 + 6↵2   4↵+ 1)k6 + (21↵4   76↵3 + 102↵2   60↵+ 13)k5 +
+(173↵4   608↵3 + 760↵2   388↵+ 63)k4 + (775↵4   2704↵3 + 3142↵2   1352↵+ 139)k3 +
+(2118↵4   6848↵3 + 7108↵2   2544↵+ 134)k2 + (3008↵4   8160↵3 + 7328↵2   2208↵+ 32)k +
+800↵4   2112↵3 + 1792↵2   448↵  32.
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